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THE EXCEPTIONAL ROLE OF COURTS IN
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
N.W. Barber & Adrian Vermeule*
INTRODUCTION
In constitutional terms, the life of the judge is normally fairly unexciting.
Most judges spend most of their time resolving disputes over facts and, having resolved the dispute to their own satisfaction, applying the law to the
case. More rarely, judges have a lawmaking role, clarifying legal rules, filling
in legal gaps, and—sometimes—modifying the law where necessary. The lawmaking task of the judge becomes more pronounced at higher levels of the
judicial hierarchy, but even in the highest courts the latitude accorded the
judge is grounded in the constitution and shaped by the law. The legal
order, contained within the constitution, establishes the institution of the
court and the office of the judge. It empowers the judge to make decisions
that bind others in the system, determining the legal standing of her judgments. And, more generally, the legal order sets the broad principles of law
that guide the judge when exercising her discretion. Even if the pre-existing
law is not determinative of the decision, it can still shape the way the judge
reasons towards her decision and limit the range of her discretion.
This Article looks at a rare, and in some ways more exciting, part of the
judicial role: those exceptional cases when the judge is called upon to pass
judgment on the constitution itself. This arises in three groups of cases,
roughly speaking. First, in exceptional cases the validity of the constitution
and the legal order is thrown into dispute. The court is asked to rule on the
legitimacy of the constitution and, by derivation, on the standing of the court
and the legal authority of the judge. The case requires the judge to pull
herself up by her own bootstraps: she is ruling on the basis of her own legitimacy, and on the constitutional jurisdiction both of the courts and other
institutions.
Second, on some occasions the judge is asked to rule on the transition
from one constitutional order to another. This can occur in the aftermath of
© 2016 N.W. Barber & Adrian Vermeule. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Trinity College, Oxford; Harvard Law School. Thanks to Richard Albert, Mikolaj
Barczentewicz, Cora Chan, Josh Chafetz, Ewan Smith, Cass Sunstein, and Mark Tushnet for
helpful comments.
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a revolution, or when the state is acceding to a new constitutional order. On
these occasions the existing constitutional order may seek to regulate the
change, but the very challenge presented by the dispute involves the incapacity of the outgoing constitution to bind its successors.
Third, there are some cases in which the health of the constitutional
order requires the judge to act not merely beyond the law, as it were, but
actually contrary to the law. The judge must act contrary to the rules of the
legal order, precisely in order to preserve the health of the legal order. The
judge must, in other words, act in a way she is not legally empowered to do.
These three groups of cases raise many different issues, but they are all
instances of the judge’s exceptional constitutional role: situations in which
the judge may properly decide the case in a manner that transcends, or even
runs contrary to, the rules of the existing legal order. This Article surveys
these situations, and reflects on the principles and processes judges have
used, and should use, to guide their reasoning. Even if the positive rules of
the legal order are unable to resolve the dispute, there are still underlying
principles of constitutionalism the judge can call upon to guide and legitimate her decision. Furthermore, given the profound, even radical, implications of these types of decisions, the process by which the court reaches its
decision may need to be modified; the judge may need to allow a broader
range of interested parties and institutions to participate in the decision than
would normally occur. Most broadly, we claim that constitutional decisionism is
inevitable in such cases. Courts sometimes have no option but to take it
upon themselves to rule upon, and indeed to participate in constituting, the
validity of the very constitutional order that gives them their authority, in a
kind of bootstrapping.
We take up our three categories of cases in order. In Part I, we examine
cases in which courts determine constitutional competence, either of themselves (Section A) or of other actors (Section B). We presume two background conditions: (1) there exists a well-defined constitutional polity, in
which the locus of sovereignty is clearly defined; (2) there is no immediate or
urgent threat to the stability of that polity. In subsequent Parts we will relax
these two conditions in turn. Part II examines constitutional transitions
(relaxing condition (1)), whilst Part III examines constitutional crises
(relaxing condition (2)).
Part IV distills our conclusions by focusing on the problem of bootstrapping. How can courts act in an authoritative way when exceptional circumstances challenge the very foundations of their authority in the first place?
There is no general answer; courts have approached the resulting dilemma
in various ways, depending upon circumstances. That there is no theoretically compelling answer does not, however, entail that there is no answer at
all. Rather, courts necessarily engage in constitutional decisionism—they make
decisions without fully worked-out theoretical foundations, based on a mix of
constitutional principles and pragmatic judgments. In this way courts offer a
forum for politically relevant actors and interests to hash out their differences by a mix of arguing and bargaining.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-2\NDL206.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 3

26-JAN-17

courts in the constitutional order

11:38

819

Our aims are both taxonomic and analytical, on the one hand, and prescriptive on the other. On the taxonomic and analytical side, we adopt the
standpoint of the analyst, attempting to identify recurring patterns of exceptional circumstances that confront judges, and attempting to understand
both the dilemmas courts face in such circumstances, and the means they use
to cope with them. There is nothing oxymoronic about this enterprise,
because exceptional circumstances within any given constitutional order
sometimes fall into recurring patterns when viewed in the aggregate across
constitutional orders.1 Given enough cases, even the mutation becomes a
species. And as we hope to show, comparative constitutional adjudication
contains identifiable species of exceptional cases.
On the prescriptive side, we offer normative advice but only nonideal
advice, subject to constraints. We do not pretend to offer a comprehensive
theory of political morality to guide judges in cases calling for constitutional
decisionism. In the nature of these cases, real dilemmas and tradeoffs, true
conflicts of principle and of value, and uncertain pragmatic judgments are
unavoidable. Yet we indicate a number of lower-level principles, both procedural and substantive, to help courts avoid hubristic or ill-informed decisionmaking and disastrous outcomes—perhaps the most that can be hoped for
when circumstances yield extraordinary situations.
I. DETERMINING,
A.

OR

SETTING,

THE

CONSTITUTIONAL BASE

OF THE

STATE

Courts Judging Their Own Constitutional Authority

We begin with a category of cases in which courts rule on the scope and
limits of their own authority. From one perspective, such cases are extremely
rare. In the mine-run of litigation, civil and even criminal parties (including
defendants) unquestioningly accept the authority of the court. The parties
will offer arguments within the system, confining themselves to contesting
their own liability or attempting to impose liability on others.
In some fraction of these ordinary cases, there may be technical questions about whether jurisdiction and venue should lie in this or that court
within the overall judicial system, but these questions are ordinary as well. In
some even smaller fraction of the cases, there may even be questions about
“reviewability” or “justiciability,” such that parties argue that no court should
take cognizance of the case. But even then, the parties will unquestioningly
accept that the court (or at least some other court in the legal system) has
competence to make that determination—they will accept, in other words,
the maxim that courts always have “jurisdiction to determine [their own]
jurisdiction.”
1 For a different taxonomy, see Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional
Crises, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 707 (2009). Balkin and Levinson categorize crises from the standpoint of constitutional design, whereas our focus is on how courts respond to crises within
an ongoing constitutional order, or during the transition between such orders. The two
approaches are partly, but only partly, overlapping.
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In the rarest cases, however, actors brought before the court offer a
more fundamental challenge to the court’s authority. These actors not only
deny the authority of the court to impose sanctions upon them, but deny the
court’s very authority to determine that question—they deny the court’s jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction. There is a superficial irony to these situations: the court appears to be asked to use legal reasoning to determine if it
has the capacity to apply the law. In these cases it would therefore beg the
question to call these actors “parties.” That is precisely what they deny being,
insofar as they challenge the very authority of the court to determine its own
jurisdiction over them. Frequently, such cases arise when one of the actors
has been compelled to appear before the tribunal. Charles I, majestic and
contemptuous in defeat, utterly denied that his “pretended Judges” had any
legal status different than “thieves and robbers by the highways.”2 But if we
admire that example, what are we to think of other political trials in which
defendants hurl defiance at their pretended judges—defendants such as
accused terrorists who refuse to acknowledge the authority of the tribunal3
or, less alarmingly, cranks who possess strong, but strange, beliefs about the
legal limitations of the courts?4
A different subcategory of cases involves not political trials, but fundamental political issues arising in the course of otherwise ordinary disputes.
These cases are “political” insofar as they call into question the foundations
of the constitutional order somehow defined, necessarily including the scope
and limits of judicial authority. Here judges decide whether they possess the
power to review legislation for conformity with some hierarchically superior
source of law, such as a written constitution, an enforceable treaty, or an
entrenched previous statute of the legislature itself that is taken to trump
subsequent legislation (at least if the subsequent legislation does not
2

Charles I famously stated:
I would know by what power I am called hither . . . . I would know by what
authority, I mean lawful; there are many unlawful authorities in the world, thieves
and robbers by the highways . . . . I have a trust committed to me by God, by old
and lawful descent; I will not betray it, to answer a new unlawful authority: therefore resolve me that, and you shall hear more of me.
....
. . . I do stand more for the Liberty of my people, than any here that come to be
my pretended Judges . . . .
4 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 995–96 (T.B. Howell ed., London, Longman &
Co. 1816); see also Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 MINN. L. REV. 347,
367–88 (2010) (describing the background of the English Revolution and the trial of King
Charles I).
3 In a trial of Islamic extremists who plotted to derail a train running between Canada
and the United States, one of the defendants “refused to acknowledge the court’s authority
[or to] retain[ ] legal counsel.” Canada Terror Suspects Planned to Derail US-Bound Train,
Court Hears, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.dw.com/en/canada-terror-sus
pects-planned-to-derail-us-bound-train-court-hears/a-18231091.
4 Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571 (Can. Alta.).
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expressly repeal the earlier). Leading examples are Marbury v. Madison5
from the United States Supreme Court in 1803, the landmark second judgment by the House of Lords in the Factortame litigation in 1990,6 and the
Mizrahi Bank case from the Supreme Court of Israel in 1995.7 A recent example from Canada is the Supreme Court Act Reference (2014), in which the
supreme court decided that its jurisdiction, although initially created by statute, is strongly entrenched against legislative revision, so that revision
requires using the process for constitutional amendment.8 The decision has
been called the “Canadian Marbury.”9 It may or may not be a coincidence
that, roughly speaking, the courts in all these cases, after due deliberation,
solemnly judged that they did indeed possess more expansive authority than
some of the actors before the court had claimed. But it is no accident that in
all these cases, the relevant courts ruled themselves competent to rule on the
limits of their own jurisdiction.
A related, if less remarkable, set of cases can be found in the decisions of
courts of the Member States of the European Union, which reassert the constitutional supremacy of their own domestic constitutions. The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) makes an ambitious set of claims for the
standing of European law. Not only does it claim that European law has
supremacy over conflicting rules of national law,10 it also claims that it, the
court, is entitled to provide definitive answers to all questions of European
law,11 and, moreover, to determine what constitutes an issue of European
law.12 If national courts accepted these claims, it would amount to a radical
shift in constitutional power: the capacity of the constitutional institutions of
the Member States to have the final say about the exercise of power within
their territory—a crucial aspect of state sovereignty—would be called into
question. Unsurprisingly, the supreme courts of the Member States have
proved unwilling to fully endorse the view of the European court.

5 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
6 R v. Sec’y of State for Transp., Ex parte Factortame Ltd. (No. 2) [1991] 1 AC 603
(HL) (appeal taken from Eng.); R v. Sec’y of State for Transp., Ex parte Factortame Ltd.
(No. 1) [1990] 2 AC 85 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
7 CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. 49(4) PD 221, [1995]
Isr. L.R. 1 (1995) (Isr.).
8 In the Matter of a Reference by the Governor in Council Concerning Sections 5 and
6 of the Supreme Court Act, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 433 (Can.).
9 Richard Albert, The Theory and Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment in
Canada, 41 QUEEN’S L.J. 143, 174 (2015).
10 Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
11 See Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 234, Mar. 25, 1957, 2002 O.J.
(C 325) 0127 (now Treaty on the Functioning of the European Community art. 267).
12 J.H.H. WEILER, The Transformation of Europe, in THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO
THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?” AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 10,
21 (1999); see also Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, 1987 E.C.R. 4199.
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The most notable dissident has been the German Constitutional Court.
In Solange I13 the German Constitutional Court rejected the supremacy of
European law. The court insisted on its duty to protect fundamental constitutional rights contained within the German Constitution: the supremacy of
European law would not be accepted by the German Constitutional Court
until the European legal order had the capacity to protect these rights. In
the Maastricht14 decision, the court rejected the Court of Justice’s claim to
have the final say as to the meaning and scope of European law. The German court stated that it would not accept surprising readings of the Lisbon
Treaty that had the effect of extending the Union’s powers.15 The recent
decision on the Treaty follows this jurisprudence: European law takes effect
through and because of the German Constitution, and that constitution limits what can be done in the name of European law.16 In the latter two cases
the German court has cited the importance of democracy as a reason,
amongst others, to maintain the primacy of the German Constitution: whilst
the European Union lacks an effective set of democratic institutions, the German court will continue to subject decisions of European institutions to the
constraints of the German Constitution.
The decisions of the German Constitutional Court are far from unique,
and many other national courts have adopted similar positions.17 These are
unusual cases—the court is being asked to rule on the scope and basis of its
own authority—but the outcome is unsurprising. In the face of a challenge
to the jurisdiction of national constitutions coming from the Court of Justice
of the European Union, the courts of the Member States have reasserted the
status quo: the Member States of the European Union have preserved their
statehood within that Union, and it is their national constitutions—not the
European Treaties—that underpin the authority of the state and, by derivation, the court. This is a form of “constitutional decisionism,” but a comparatively dull one. These courts have considered the assertion that their
constitutional foundation has shifted, that they have become parts of a new
legal order, and have rejected the claim. The judges have been asked to pass
13 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 29, 1974,
37 BVerfGE 271, 2 C.M.L.R. 540, 1974 (Ger.).
14 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993,
89 BVerfGE 155, 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 1994 (Ger.); see Manfred Zuleeg, The European Constitution
Under Constitutional Constraints: The German Scenario, 22 EUR. L. REV. 19 (1997) (offering an
energetic criticism of the decision); see also Mattias Kumm, Who Is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?: Three Conceptions of the Relationship Between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 351 (1999).
15 1 C.M.L.R. at 84.
16 See generally Christian Wohlfahrt, The Lisbon Case: A Critical Summary, 10 GER. L.J.
1277 (2009).
17 See, e.g., CE Ass., 20 octobre 1989, Rec. Lebon 190, 1 C.M.L.R. 173 (1990) (Fr.);
Corte Cost., 27 dicembre 1973, Giur. it. 1973, I, 1, 2401, 2 C.M.L.R. 372 (1974) (It.); R
(HS2 Action Alliance Ltd.) v. Sec’y of State for Transp. [2014] UKSC 3 (appeal taken from
Eng.) (UK); see also Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Solange, Chapter 3’: Constitutional Courts in Central
Europe—Democracy—European Union, 14 EUR. L.J. 1 (2008).
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judgment on the legal basis of their authority—and this assessment necessarily requires the judges to consider making decisions that would be beyond
the scope of their powers under the existing legal system—but have declined
the invitation to effect constitutional change.
1.

Exceptions as the Norm

So far we have called all these cases rare or exceptional. They pose
exceptions to the normal legal framework and reveal the hidden presuppositions of that framework, presuppositions that operate just as fully in “ordinary” or “normal” cases, albeit with lower visibility. When judges hear the
most ordinary criminal cases and determine them one way or another, perhaps with a jury’s help, they are exercising jurisdiction. That exercise necessarily implies (whether or not the thought ever occurs to the judge) that the
court has jurisdiction, and it therefore also necessarily implies that the court
has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. It turns out that every case
is the exceptional case, in which courts assert this sort of reflexive jurisdictional competence.
2.

Judges in Their Own Cause

It should also be apparent from these cases that there is at least a severe
tension between two deep principles of the law. On the one hand, there is
the maxim necessarily implied by any judicial determination, that judges
have “jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction.” On the other hand,
there is an equally hoary maxim of the law: nemo iudex in sua causa, “no man
should be judge in his own case.”18 The judges in these cases are judges in
their own causes, in at least an indirect institutional sense; their determination of the scope and limits of their own jurisdiction will determine the relative power and importance of the judiciary and the courts as constitutional
actors, vis-à-vis other officials and actors. (In yet other cases, as when judges
sit to determine the constitutional requirements for judicial salaries,19 they
are judges in their own cause in a more direct, personal, and material sense).
For this reason, it is necessarily and not merely contingently specious—
an incomplete and therefore misleading comparison—when judgments
announcing the power of the courts to review the decisions of legislatures or
other actors are justified on the ground that, absent such power, the legislature would become a “judge in its own cause,” or a “fox in charge of the
henhouse.” Judges who make that determination are necessarily (although
perhaps implicitly) ruling on the limits of their own power as well. The ultimate question is not whether some institution will have unreviewable power to
18 Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits of Impartiality, 122
YALE L.J. 384 (2012).
19 See, e.g., United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001) (deciding whether a statutory
change in judicial compensation violated the Compensation Clause of Article III); see also
John O’Dowd, Judges in Whose Cause? The Irish Bench After the Judges’ Pay Referendum, 48 IRISH
JURIST 102 (2012).
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determine the limits of its own power, but rather which institution will do so.
Jeremy Waldron puts it clearly:
Those who invoke the maxim nemo iudex in sua causa in this context say that
it requires that a final decision about rights should not be left in the hands
of the people. Rather, it should be passed on to an independent and impartial institution such as a court.
It is hard to see the force of this argument. Almost any conceivable
decision-rule will eventually involve someone deciding in his own case.
Unless we envisage a literally endless chain of appeals, there will always be
some person or institution whose decision is final. And of that person or
institution, we can always say that because it has the last word, its members
are ipso facto ruling on the acceptability of their own view.20

There is one further twist, however. It is perfectly possible to have (what
in the United States would be called) a “departmentalist” system, in which
more than one institution has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.
Each such institution may form a view about the scope and limits of its own
constitutional power, and act on that view. In such an arrangement, it is
emphatically not the case that there is no institution that determines the limits of its own power. Rather the premise of the system is that there are multiple such institutions—many foxes in charge of the henhouse. These
institutions may not only take a view about the scope of their own power, but
also about the jurisdiction of other bodies within the system. This may be
done directly—one body may seek to rule on the competence of another—or
by implication, where an institution’s decision about its own jurisdiction has
implications for the capacities and duties of other bodies.
When, as sometimes happens in a departmentalist system, the views of
the several institutions about the scope(s) of their own power(s) are logically
or pragmatically incompatible, the system may leave it legally undetermined
who should prevail. Such disagreement may persist without resolution—constitutional disputes can be surprisingly durable21—but if the dispute is forced
to a conclusion, the victory will often go to the institution that can better
marshal the forces of public opinion.22 As a matter of constitutional engineering, the thought behind creating such disagreement, or allowing it to
persist, is that, quite predictably, the foxes will fall to fighting amongst themselves, “battling . . . in self-defense.”23 This indirect mechanism will protect
20 Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346,
1400–01 (2006).
21 The dispute over the relative jurisdiction of the House of Commons and the courts
over the scope of parliamentary privilege persisted for at least a hundred and fifty years.
See JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC
NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 68–86 (2007).
22 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991,
1006 (2008).
23 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 35 (rev. ed. 2013). For the role of
institutional self-defence in a constitutional order, see N.W. Barber, Self-Defence for Institutions, 72 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 558 (2013); David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers,
124 YALE L.J. 2 (2014).
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the chickens more reliably than the direct mechanism of trying to keep all
foxes away from the henhouse all the time—probably a hopeless endeavour
in the long run. Whatever its engineering merits, however, the departmentalist system proliferates, rather than eliminates, institutions that in some
sense act as judges in their own causes.24
B.

Courts Determining the Constitutional Jurisdiction of All Constitutional Actors

In many of these cases, courts assert constitutional competence not only
to determine their own competence, but also to determine the constitutional
jurisdiction of all relevant constitutional bodies or institutions. This category
includes some of the most famous judgments in constitutional law around
the globe; examples are Marbury v. Madison, Factortame, and Mizrahi Bank. All
of these cases involved courts deciding whether they possessed the power of
judicial review (somehow defined, in strong or weak form), and indeed
deciding that they did possess it. But all of the cases necessarily also involved
courts laying out a comprehensive vision of the allocation of constitutional
powers across the major institutions of the constitutional order. Indeed,
these courts derived their conclusions about judicial review from a comprehensive theory of competences. We will examine Marbury and Mizrahi as particularly pure examples (in part because both cases strictly involve domestic
constitutionalism, and lack the complex overlay of supra-national treaties
that structured the questions in Factortame).25
In both cases, we suggest, the court’s comprehensive theory of the constitutional allocation of competences represented, at bottom, an exercise in
creative decisionism. The legal materials, combined with ordinary principles of
logic and the ordinary tools of the lawyers’ craft, simply underdetermined
the questions at hand; multiple different answers to those questions were
legally and logically possible. The relevant courts, in the end, “exercise[d]
the sovereign prerogative of choice,”26 and attempted to will into being a
particular specification or conception of the constitutional order. Of course
that is not what they said they were doing—especially not in Marbury v.
Madison (Mizrahi Bank is more candid, although not completely so). But that
is what they did nonetheless.
1.

Marbury

The immediate legal issue in Marbury was whether the Supreme Court
could, and should, issue a writ commanding the Secretary of State, James
Madison, to deliver an official commission to William Marbury.27 The Court
24 Vermeule, supra note 18, at 396–97.
25 For discussion of Factortame, see N.W. Barber, The Afterlife of Parliamentary Sovereignty,
9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 144 (2011); P.P. Craig, Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament After
Factortame, 11 Y.B. EUR. L. 221, 252–53 (1991).
26 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 461
(1899).
27 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 146 (1803).
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issued a complicated, backhanded holding that established its power to
review the acts of all other bodies for constitutionality, including legislative
enactments, whilst nonetheless avoiding an immediate political confrontation. The Court’s trick was to first declare that it indeed had the power, in a
validly presented case, to order compliance by executive officials; but then to
immediately declare unconstitutional the statute vesting it with “original
jurisdiction” (jurisdiction in the first instance) to decide the case at all.28
That odd combination of holdings exercised the constitutional power of statutory invalidation whilst eliminating the legal predicate for the lawsuit,
thereby ducking immediate conflict.
What is important for our purposes is the Court’s major rationale, which
attempted to derive the power of judicial review from the intrinsic character
of adjudication in courts that interpret written and hierarchically superior
constitutions. The Court claimed that when judges decide cases, and a party
claims that a statute is inconsistent with the written Constitution, the Court
must either prefer the Constitution to the statute, or vice versa.29 The very
nature and idea of a written and hierarchically superior Constitution entails
that the Court must prefer the Constitution to the statute—or so the argument runs.30
As many have pointed out, however, the deduction was then and is now
simply fallacious.31 The bare notion of interpreting a written constitution in
court, by itself, entails nothing at all about what judges are to do when there
is an inconsistency between a statute and the constitution. As a logical matter, it is perfectly possible to imagine a regime in which there is a written
constitution, acknowledged by all to be paramount law, yet in which courts
are not to enforce that constitution by setting aside or ignoring duly enacted
legislation. Rather the enforcement mechanisms, in such a regime, are
extrajudicial (“political,” if we like);32 the constitution is enforced by electoral retribution, by the vaguer but powerful sanction of ambient popular disapproval, and by competition amongst elected officials. We can imagine
such a regime because many such regimes have actually existed, including in
many American states before Marbury, and in polities around the world. A
written constitution may be paramount law even if it is not enforced as such
by courts. Analytically, the two questions are entirely distinct.
The legal materials and institutional background in Marbury simply
underdetermined the question of judicial review. The Court was in effect
faced with a choice between distinct constitutional regimes, featuring distinct
(packages of) enforcement mechanisms; the Court’s decision, in effect
(whether or not fully thought through), represents a choice, an attempt to
28 Id. at 175–76.
29 Id. at 176–77.
30 Id.
31 See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE
L.J. 1, 17–18.
32 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 251–53 (2004).
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push the entire set of constitutional institutions in one direction rather than
another—in effect, to help create a new constitutional order. That order
took decades, indeed generations, to fully emerge, but the principle laid
down in Marbury has triumphed in the long run. Indeed, it has metastasized
into ever-stronger forms.33
2.

Mizrahi Bank

The sprawling, absurdly verbose set of judgments from the Supreme
Court of Israel in Mizrahi Bank, larded with repetitive and exhaustive block
quotations, defy easy summary.34 A stylized and simplified version runs this
way. In 1992, the Knesset enacted a statute entitled “Basic Law: Human Liberty and Dignity,” which guaranteed certain rights.35 In particular, it forbade
violation of rights guaranteed by the Basic Law except “by a law befitting the
values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent
no greater than is required.”36 It is apparent on the face of this statute that it
attempts to specify conditions for the validity of subsequent legislation
enacted by the same body, the Knesset. Now, of course, it is an open question whether the law might nonetheless be repealed by the express or necessarily implied terms of a subsequent law on the same level of the legal
hierarchy. But if anything is required over and above what would be
required to repeal ordinary legislation, then to that extent the law would
have a binding effect on later legislators.
All of this immediately raises a formidable question, a chestnut of constitutional theory: whether a parliamentary body can bind “itself,” enacting
“entrenched” legislation that to some degree constrains the freedom of
action of later legislators in the same body.37 The members of the Supreme
Court of Israel issued an array of judgments addressing the question; the
bottom line was that the court upheld the power of the Knesset to bind
“itself” through Basic Laws establishing entrenched guarantees.38 Not at all
incidentally, the court also clearly established its own power to review subsequent ordinary legislation (i.e., non-Basic legislation) for conformity with
Basic Laws39—a kind of weak-form constitutional judicial review. The
33 See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (proclaiming judicial supremacy in
constitutional matters).
34 CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. 49(4) PD 221, [1995]
Isr. L.R. 1 (1995) (Isr.).
35 Id. at 21.
36 Id. at 22 (quoting Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752–1992, SH No. 1391
p. 90, as amended (Isr.)).
37 As to these questions, see N.W. Barber, Why Entrench?, 14 INT.’L J. CONST. L. 325
(2016), and Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111
YALE L.J. 1665 (2002).
38 Rivka Weill, Reconciling Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Review: On the Theoretical
and Historical Origins of the Israeli Legislative Override Power, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457,
501 (2012).
39 Mizrahi Bank, [1995] Isr. L.R. at 34, 62, 84, 97 (opinion of Shamgar, J.).
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supreme court also held that entrenchment was effective only when included
in a certain type of statute: a Basic Law.40 It falls to the courts to determine
whether a statute is or is not a “Basic Law” and may be entrenched; the decision by the Knesset to label the statute a “Basic Law” is indicative, but not
decisive.41 Not only did the supreme court empower the Knesset to create
entrenched constitutional rules within the Israeli system, it also opened up
the possibility that it could adjudicate the constitutionality of these attempts
at entrenchment. As in a number of other constitutional systems, the court
has reserved to itself the right to distinguish between “constitutional” and
“unconstitutional” constitutional amendments.42
Political theology was the order of the day. One judgment took the paradoxical line that the unlimited sovereignty of the Knesset entails that it has
the power to bind itself through restrictions on future legislation—lacking
that power would imply less than omnipotence.43 But the leading judgment,
by Justice Aharon Barak, took a more plausible line that the Knesset actually
enjoys multiple powers, conferred upon it by the pouvoir constituent—the first
Knesset and, behind that, the “national consciousness and legislative history
of the State of Israel.”44 On this view, the Knesset may act in two distinct
capacities, as an ordinary assembly or a constituent assembly, and may thus
produce two distinct instruments: ordinary statutes, on the one hand, and
Basic Laws on the other.
Barak leveraged the holding that the Knesset could create quasi-constitutional basic laws into a Marbury-style holding, that the court could review
ordinary legislation for conformity with Basic Laws.45 On this point, his judgment advanced a step beyond Marbury; it did not fallaciously assume that the
hierarchical legal superiority of Basic Laws automatically entails that judges
should enforce them to trump ordinary legislation. Instead the argument
was that “legal tradition” entails that the remedy for violation of higher law is
“abrogation by the courts.”46 One may pick and choose amongst traditions,
of course, and Barak did so with gusto, offering a smorgasbord of decisions
from around the world that supported judicial review, but essentially ignoring the existence of equally widespread traditions, from equally reputable
constitutional democracies, that denied it.47 Just as the argument from the
intrinsic character of adjudication in Marbury obscured the essentially creative institutional decision that the Court made, so too with the selective argument from legal tradition in Mizrahi Bank.
40 Id. at 41; id. at 183 (opinion of Barak, J.)
41 Id. at 42, 71, 76, 102 (opinion of Shamgar, J.); id. at 208 (opinion of Barak, J.).
42 Aharon Barak, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, 44 ISR. L. REV. 321, 338–41
(2011).
43 Mizrahi Bank, [1995] Isr. L.R. at 359, 380 (opinion of Cheshin, J.).
44 Id. at 3 (syllabus).
45 Id. at 139, 218–32 (opinion of Barak, J.).
46 Id. at 5 (syllabus).
47 Id. at 218–22 (opinion of Barak, J.)
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Creative Decisionism in New Constitutional Orders

It was no accident that these courts were faced with the need for creative
decisions about the institutional structure of the constitutional order. In a
relevant sense, both polities were young polities, in which the constitutional
arrangements were still very much up for grabs (in the United States) and
changing rapidly under various external and internal pressures (Israel).
Courts in new or rapidly changing constitutional polities will often have both
more scope to push constitutional arrangements in preferred directions, and
greater incentive to do so. They have more scope because the roles and positions of other institutions are more fluid and malleable; there are fewer fixed
routines, entrenched constituencies, and unquestioned norms and traditions
to constrain judicial action. They have greater incentive because of the large
net benefits of molding constitutional arrangements, relative to letting other
institutions do so. In the examples given above the courts were successful,
and the judges were able to shape the fundamental structures of the constitution, but such success cannot be guaranteed. When the Supreme People’s
Court of China sought to make the Chinese Constitution judicially enforceable in Qi Yuling v. Chen Xiaoqi (2001),48 its decision was not followed by other
courts and—after a period of being studiously ignored—was declared void in
2008.49 The attempt to create a Chinese Marbury had failed. Whereas Marbury and Mizrahi Bank show the judges as effective constitutional innovators,
Qi Yuling is an instance where the judges were unable to exercise this capacity: the role of the court in the development of the Chinese Constitution
remains unusually limited.
These examples demonstrate that in relatively plastic and unsettled constitutional orders, someone or another will push institutions into a pathdependent trajectory that, if successful, will be very difficult for later actors to
undo. These issues arise with particular force in constitutional transitions—
either from one constitutional order to another within a polity, or when a
new polity comes into being, as by secession or the withdrawal of an imperial
power. We take up these questions in the next Part.
II. TRANSITIONS: THE ASCRIPTION

OF

SOVEREIGN POWER

BY

COURTS

The constitutional position of the judge at the start of a new political
order is a delicate one. The normal way in which questions of constitutional
legitimacy—and legal legitimacy—are answered is by the identification of an
empowering rule. Institutions are constitutionally legitimate because there
are rules that establish and validate them; these rules, in their turn, were
passed by institutions that were established by other rules. This chain of
validity often extends a great distance but, at some point, it comes to an end.
There must be a rule or a collection of rules that, ultimately, lack a constitutional grounding. The constitutional validity of this rule is—must be—
48 73 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 158 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2001) (China).
49 See QIANFAN ZHANG, THE CONSTITUTION OF CHINA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 173–74
(2012).
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accepted by the institutions, officials, and, perhaps a portion of the citizenry,
if the state is to function.50 In an established state this rarely presents significant problems—legal disputes do not normally extend so far back into the
constitutional order—but the constitutional foundations of a new state are
more exposed; the tradition of constitutional acceptance has yet to be established. Indeed, courts in transitional situations may be called upon to do no
less than to declare the locus of sovereignty. We will examine cases of that
sort in Section A, and then look at special problems posed by ongoing treaties in Section B.
A.

Transitions and the Locus of Sovereignty

There are at least three groups of transitional situations in which courts,
especially supreme courts, may engage with the foundational rules of new
states. First, and least controversially, the courts may explicitly endorse the
new constitutional order. The judges’ public acceptance of the constitutional foundations of the new state is a significant act of acceptance in itself
and, also, provides a signal that other state officials and citizens should also
endorse the constitution. Often, this will require the judges to legally
endorse a pre-existing political consensus, and, even if there is no legal
authority for the outcome, the political good sense of the decision is not in
doubt. Secondly, and far more controversially, the judges may be asked to
resolve a dispute over the very existence of the state. It may be unclear
whether a new constitutional territory has emerged, or whether an older constitutional order continues to prevail over the territory. On rare occasions,
the court may have the capacity to resolve the dispute even when there is no
political consensus. Finally, the courts may sometimes act as midwives to new
constitutional orders; handing down decisions that may help solidify political
consensus around the emergence of a new state or, at least, creating constitutional space in which that political consensus can emerge.
It is not uncommon to find judicial statements about the foundations of
constitutional orders in the years after independence. Perhaps the most
recent example of such a case is found in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal.
In Hong Kong v. Ma Wai-Kwan,51 the Hong Kong Court of Appeal considered
the continuing applicability of common law rules to the law of Hong Kong.
It decided that these rules remained part of that legal order, but only
because the Basic Law incorporated them into the system.52 The foundation
of the legal order had shifted from English law53 to the indigenous Basic
Law: even though the vast bulk of the laws of Hong Kong remained constant,
50 Or, to complicate matters, it may be more accurate to say that the validity of some or
all of a set of foundational rules must be accepted. See N.W. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
STATE 145–71 (2010).
51 [1997] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 761 (C.A.) (H.K.).
52 Id. ¶ 95.
53 The pre-1997 Hong Kong legal order rested on the exercise of a prerogative power.
See Albert HY Chen, The Interpretation of the Basic Law—Common Law and Mainland Chinese
Perspectives, 30 H.K.L.J. 380, 417–20 (2000).
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their constitutional foundation had changed. Hong Kong had become a part
of China; sovereignty over the territory had shifted. Albert Chen has
described this as amounting to a replacement of the grundnorm: the changing
loyalties of the judges altered the fundamental rule of the Hong Kong legal
order, a change mandated by the new political consensus over the basis of
Hong Kong’s constitution.54
Hong Kong is not, of course, a state—though, as we shall see, the ambiguities around its constitutional status make it a particularly interesting lens
through which to examine the role of the courts—but the type of decision
seen in Ma Wai-Kwan is one found in many post-independence polities. In
the case of The State (Ryan) v. Lennon,55 for example, the Supreme Court of
the Irish Free State identified the Irish Constitution56 as the fundamental law
of the nation, the legitimacy of which rested on the Third Dáil Éireann sitting as a constituent assembly and articulating the will of the Irish people.57
Similarly, in the Australian case of Sue v. Hill58 the High Court declared that
the Australia Act 1986 had succeeded in bringing about Australian constitutional independence, whilst in Leeth v. Commonwealth59 the court identified
the Australian people as providing the foundational legitimacy of the Australian state.60
The Hong Kong and Australian decisions were relatively uncontroversial. In these cases the courts endorsed a shift in sovereignty that had previously been endorsed by the body ceding power—not only was there general
agreement within these territories over the desirability of independence, but
there was, also, agreement between these new states and the old imperial
power: Britain.61 The Irish example proved more difficult. Whilst the Dáil
presented itself as a constituent assembly, a body competent to craft a constitution for an independent state, and whilst the Irish Supreme Court subsequently endorsed this view, a rival understanding of the constitutional status
of Ireland was expressed by the old imperial institutions. At around the same
time the Dáil enacted the Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann) Act 1922, the United Kingdom Parliament enacted the Irish Free State
Constitution Act 1922.62 These two legal instruments were largely similar,63
save that the first provided an indigenous grounding for the Irish Constitu54 Id. at 418.
55 [1935] 1 IR 170 (H. Ct.) (Ir.).
56 CONSTITUTION OF THE IRISH FREE STATE 1922.
57 K.C. WHEARE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH 90–92
(1960).
58 (1999) 199 CLR 462 (Austl.).
59 (1992) 174 CLR 455 (Austl.).
60 See also Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 (Austl.); cf. Re: Objection
to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793 (Can.) (rejecting the oneprovince veto as contrary to the principle of equality of the provinces).
61 See Australia Act 1986, c. 2 (UK); Hong Kong Act 1985, c. 15 (UK).
62 Irish Free State Constitution Act 1922, 13 Geo. 5 c. 1 (UK).
63 There were some important differences that are not relevant for our purposes. See
WHEARE, supra note 57, at 93.
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tion whilst the second grounded it in an act of the Westminster Parliament.64
This disagreement was also manifested in judicial decisions. The decision of
the Irish Supreme Court in Ryan has already been discussed, but it had its
parallel in the Privy Council case of Moore, decided the following year. In
Moore v. The Attorney-General for the Irish Free State, the Privy Council identified
the Imperial Parliament as the source of the Irish constitutional order’s legitimacy.65 It seems that whilst there was significant consensus within Ireland
about the desirability of independence, this consensus was not shared by the
British political and legal elite. In the face of this disagreement, the Irish
political class could, perhaps, have relied upon Ryan as an authoritative statement of the base of the constitution; it could have ignored both the Imperial
Parliament and the Privy Council. Instead, Ireland chose to enact a new constitution in such a manner that the chain of constitutional legitimacy could
not be traced back to the Westminster Parliament. Ireland’s 1937 constitution was approved by the Dáil but, crucially, that institution did not purport
to enact the document; instead the constitution was put to a referendum,
and grounded its constitutional legitimacy explicitly in the will of the Irish
people.66 In this instance, it seems that the Irish court’s attempt to resolve
the constitutional deadlock was not regarded as sufficient to demonstrate the
autonomy of the Irish constitutional order.
Some thirty years after Ryan, the courts of Southern Rhodesia faced a
similar dilemma. Before 1965, the Rhodesian Constitution took the form of
an Order in Council,67 which had been made under a power conferred by a
British statute.68 Although the Rhodesian legislature was accorded wide constitutional independence, it was not given the power to alter entrenched provisions of the constitution.69 On November 11, 1965, the Rhodesian Prime
Minister declared Rhodesian independence, and sought to bring into effect a
new constitution: the “Constitution of Rhodesia, 1965.”70 This document
purported to replace the old imperial constitution. The 1965 constitution
provided that no United Kingdom statute would apply to Rhodesia unless its
effect was extended to Rhodesia by the Rhodesian Parliament,71 and the constitution removed the right of appeal to the Privy Council on matters relating
to the Declaration of Rights. The Westminster Parliament responded with
the Southern Rhodesian Act 1965, which reasserted Westminster’s control,
and, in an Order in Council made under the Act, emphasized that constitu64 See CONSTITUTION OF THE IRISH FREE STATE (SAORSTÁT ÉIREANN) ACT 1922; Irish Free
State Constitution Act 1922, 13 Geo. 5 c. 1 (Eng.).
65 [1935] AC 484, 497 (PC) (appeal taken from Irish Free State) (UK).
66 See CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND (BUNREACHT NA HÈIREANN) pmbl., art. 1.
67 Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order in Council 1961, SI 1961, art. 2314 (UK).
68 Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Act 1961, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2 c. 2 (UK). For further
discussion of the Rhodesian crisis, see BARBER, supra note 50, at 145–71.
69 GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 64–72 (1971); J.M. Eekelaar, Splitting
the Grundnorm, 30 MOD. L. REV. 156, 162 (1967).
70 Proclamation No. 53, 1965, Rhodesian Gov’t Notice 737N (1965), reprinted in Rhodesia: Proclamation of Independence, 5 I.L.M. 230 (1966); see also Eekelaar, supra note 69, at 159.
71 CONSTITUTION OF RHODESIA 1965 §§ 3–5; see also Eekelaar, supra note 69, at 159.
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tional change could only occur through a statute of the Westminster Parliament.72 In Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke73 the Privy Council considered the
legal implications of this mess; it held that the usurpation was unlawful, and
that the purported 1965 constitution was of no legal effect. In contrast, the
Rhodesian courts, after some hesitation,74 endorsed the 1965 constitution75
and rejected the Privy Council’s continued role as the final court of appeal
for Rhodesia.76 The old imperial court—the Privy Council—had, from its
seat in Downing Street, failed to prevent the emergence of the new state.
The Rhodesian courts, in contrast, contrary to the pre-existing rules of judicial and statutory hierarchy, but following the elite political consensus in
Rhodesia, were able to resolve, for a time, Rhodesia’s constitutional crisis by
accepting the constitutional autonomy of the 1965 constitution.
The previous two groups of cases involved the judges passing judgment
on the creation of a new constitutional order. A third group of cases can be
identified where the courts create space in which a new constitutional order
could develop, if the political will is found to push for its creation. Even
before the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) settled the question, Australian judges
minimized the roles of the old imperial institutions, and were signalling their
willingness to support constitutional independence. For example, the role of
the Privy Council in Australian cases was steadily reduced.77 Initially, this was
as a result of legislation—in 1968 and 1975 the Australian Parliament limited
the range of cases in which a litigant could appeal to the Privy Council78—
but these legislative limitations were supported and reinforced by the judges.
The High Court confirmed that the Australian Parliament did, indeed, possess the capacity to constrict access to the imperial court,79 and it was the
High Court, rather than the Parliament, that finally ended the capacity of the
Australian states to appeal through it to the Privy Council.80 As the possibility of appeal to the Privy Council was steadily restricted, the High Court also
sought to limit the significance of the rulings of that body. In Viro v. The
Queen it was no longer bound by decisions of the Privy Council,81 and a
72 Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, c. 76, § 1 (UK).
73 [1969] 1 AC 645 (PC) (appeal taken from S. Rhodesia) (UK).
74 See Eekelaar, supra note 69; J.M. Eekelaar, Rhodesia: The Abdication of Constitutionalism, 32 MOD. L. REV. 19 (1969); Tayyab Mahmud, Jurisprudence of Successful Treason: Coup
d’Etat & Common Law, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 49, 60–65 (1994).
75 R. v. Ndhlovu [1968] 4 SA 515, 535 (AD) (Rhodesia); see COLIN MUNRO, STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 152 (2d ed. 1999).
76 Dhlamini v. Carter [1968] 2 SA 445, 464, 465 (AD) (Rhodesia).
77 GEORGE WILLIAMS ET AL., AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY 118–21
(6th ed. 2014).
78 Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975 (Cth) (Austl.); Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968 (Cth) (Austl.).
79 A-G (Cth) v T & G Mut Life Soc’y Ltd (1978) 144 CLR 161 (Austl.).
80 Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Proprietary Ltd [No. 2] (1985) 159 CLR 461, 464
(Austl.). However, the capacity of the state courts to allow appeals remained until 1986, see
S Ctr of Theosophy, Inc v S Austl (1979) 145 CLR 246, 264 (Austl.).
81 Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88 (Austl.).
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majority of the judges in that case asserted that state courts should treat decisions of the High Court as taking precedence over decisions of the imperial
body.82
Alongside the marginalization of the Privy Council, a number of Australian judges also indicated that they would no longer accept the authority of
the Westminster Parliament over Australia.83 Perhaps the strongest statement of this position was given by Justice Murphy, in Bistricic v. Rokov, in
which he argued that the enactment of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 had stripped the United Kingdom Parliament of its power
to pass statutes that had force in the Australian legal order.84 According to
Murphy, the constitutional basis of the Australian system was the acceptance
by the Australian people of this statute, rather than its enactment by Westminster.85 In a later case Justice Deane expressed a similar view, though in
more cautious language. Deane indicated that the justices might endorse the
view that Australia was a sovereign state, and, like Murphy, identified the Australian people as the source of its constitutional authority.86
It should be noted that the opinions of Murphy and Deane were far
from uncontroversial and as late as 1979 there were judges who contended
that Westminster retained a power to legislate for Australia.87 But their
speeches stood as a warning, as an opportunity, and as threads that could
later be woven into the constitutional story of an independent Australia. As a
warning, the dicta raised the potential costs for the Westminster Parliament
in the unlikely event that it would be tempted to legislate for Australia.
There was a chance that such legislation would be ignored by the Australian
courts and, as in the Rhodesian example,88 the attempt to exercise the remnants of imperial power would lead to the ending of that power. As an
opportunity, the speeches indicated that a portion, at least, of the judiciary
would be willing to support Australian constitutional independence, even
without the support of the Westminster Parliament.89 The eventual mechanism used to secure independence—legislation enacted in both the Australian and Westminster Parliaments simultaneously90—was effective, but was,
perhaps, not the only way in which this end could have been achieved.
Finally, these speeches form part of the ideology that animates the Australian
Constitution. When, after 1986, in Leeth the Australian High Court identified
82 Id.
83 PETER C. OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENCE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND NEW ZEALAND 233–39 (2005).
84 See Bistricic v Rokov (1976) 135 CLR 552, 565–67 (Austl.); see also Robinson v W Austl
Museum (1977) 138 CLR 283, 343–44 (Austl.).
85 Bistricic, 135 CLR at 567.
86 Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Proprietary Ltd [No. 2] (1985) 159 CLR 461, 464–65
(Austl.).
87 See China Ocean Shipping Co v South Australia (1979) 145 CLR 172, 209 (Austl.) (opinion of Stephen, J.).
88 See supra notes 67–76 and accompanying text.
89 See, e.g., China Ocean Shipping Co., 145 CLR at 209 (opinion of Stephen, J.).
90 See Australia Act 1986 (Cth) (Austl.); Australia Act 1986, c. 2, § 16 (UK).
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the Australian people as the source of the constitutional order, the judges
were building on the ideas expressed in these earlier decisions.91
Hong Kong’s judges have also created constitutional space within which
the constitutional relationship between that territory and the Mainland
could, one day, be reassessed. A little while after Ma Wai-Kwan92 was
decided, in Ng Ka Ling, the judges of the Court of Final Appeal took a different view.93 They presented Hong Kong’s Basic Law as constraining the
capacity of the Mainland’s institutions to act within Hong Kong’s constitutional order: Hong Kong’s courts could review legislation of the National
People’s Congress and the interpretive decisions of the Standing Committee
that extended to Hong Kong.94 Where those decisions went against the Basic
Law the Hong Kong courts could find them invalid or ineffective.95 This
ruling proved to be the high-water mark of judicial separatism in Hong Kong.
Following pressure from the Mainland, the court glossed its decision, making
clear that decisions of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress bound the courts,96 and in Lau Kong Yung, decided later that year, the
court revisited the question of the relationship between the legal institutions
of Hong Kong and those of the Mainland.97 It accepted that the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress had the power to issue binding
interpretations of the Basic Law—even if there had been no judicial request
for a ruling by that body.98 However, the case left open the question of
whether this power was grounded in a provision of the Basic Law,99 or in the
Chinese Constitution;100 as each instrument included such an interpretative
power, the Hong Kong court probably saw no need to choose between them.
Lau Kong Yung consequently steers a middle course between Ma Wai-Kwan
and Ng Ka Ling: the question of the fundamental basis of Hong Kong law is
left open, and the possibility remains that a future court could hold that the
Standing Committee’s jurisdiction is confined within the bounds set by the
Basic Law, as determined by Hong Kong institutions.
The power asserted in the first Ng Ka Ling decision has never been
invoked by the Hong Kong courts.101 If the National People’s Congress’s
91 See generally Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455 (Austl.).
92 Hong Kong v. Ma Wai-Kwan, [1997] H.K.L.R.D. 761 (C.A.) (H.K.).
93 Ng Ka Ling v. Dir. of Immigration, [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 315 (C.F.A.) (H.K.).
94 Id. at 318–19.
95 Id. at 318.
96 Id. at 343; see Albert H.Y. Chen, The Rule of Law Under “One Country, Two Systems”:
The Case of Hong Kong 1997–2010, 6 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 269, 271–76 (2011).
97 Lau Kong Yung v. Dir. of Immigration, [1999] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 778 (C.F.A.) (H.K.).
98 Id. at 798.
99 See XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 158 (H.K.).
100 See XIANFA art. 67, § 1 (1982) (China).
101 But see Hong Kong v. Ng Kung Siu, in which the Court of Appeal of the High Court
did review a decision of the Standing Committee to insert a Chinese law on flag desecration into the Basic Law, but, in the event, found it compatible with the Basic Law. [1999] 1
H.K.L.R.D. 783, 791 (C.A.).
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power to amend the Basic Law is limited by the Basic Law,102 it could be
argued that the case places the Basic Law above the Chinese Constitution in
the context of the Hong Kong system: Hong Kong judges will only recognize
as effective those amendments that are permitted by the Basic Law, after
all.103 On this account, it is the Basic Law and not the Chinese Constitution
that empowers the National People’s Congress to act in Hong Kong. It is safe
to assume that were this question put to the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress, this institution would side with the account of
Hong Kong’s legal order given in Ma Wai-Kwan and reject that articulated in
the original Ng Ka Ling ruling.
Like the Australian cases, discussed above,104 the decision in Ng Ka Ling
creates ambiguity over the fundamental base of the Hong Kong order, an
ambiguity that persists after Lau Kong Yung—and it is, perhaps, significant
that one of the judges in Ng Ka Ling was Sir Anthony Mason, who had sat on
a number of the key Australian cases discussed earlier.105 As with the pre1986 Australian dicta,106 the judgment in Ng Ka Ling should be seen as one
that creates constitutional space rather than as an assertion of a power that
the courts can utilize: as a matter of raw politics, it is hard, in present circumstances, to imagine a Hong Kong judge declaring a decision of the National
People’s Congress contrary to Hong Kong law. But the decision does create
the possibility that, at some point in the future, Hong Kong’s judges could
use Ng Ka Ling to distance Hong Kong’s legal order from that of the Mainland. There is the potential that, in changed times, Hong Kong’s courts
could set aside attempts by China’s institutions to determine the laws of
Hong Kong—a potential that might, in itself, help restrain Beijing. And if
there were a political will in Hong Kong to push towards constitutional independence, the Hong Kong courts, like their Australian cousins, would have
introduced the flexibility into the constitutional order needed to accommodate these aspirations.
B.

Constitutional Foundations: The Special Problems of Treaties

The previous Section discussed cases in which judges attempted to determine, or to define, the location of sovereignty, considering whether the legal
order of which the court was a part was the legal order of a state, or a legal
order contained within a semi-autonomous territory located within a broader
constitutional structure. As well as ascertaining the location of sovereignty,
judges may also be compelled to determine the constitutional foundations of
102 Article 159 of the Basic Law precludes amendments that “contravene the established basic policies of the People’s Republic of China regarding Hong Kong.” XIANGGANG
JIBEN FA art. 159 (H.K.).
103 Ng Ka Ling v. Dir. of Immigration, [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 315, 318 (C.F.A.).
104 See supra notes 77–88 and accompanying text.
105 Mason sat in Bistricic v Rokov (1976) 135 CLR 552, 565–67 (Austl.), Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Proprietary Ltd [No. 2] (1985) 159 CLR 461 (Austl.), and the post-1986 case
of Leeth v. Commonwealth [1992] HCA 29 (Austl.).
106 See supra notes 77–91 and accompanying text.
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the polity: the rules on which the constitution rests, and which then empower
and constrain the institutions of the constitution, including, of course, the
court itself. Here we examine the special problems of foundational assessment that the court may be asked to make relating to the continuing constitutional significance of a treaty, perhaps one concluded with an outgoing
imperial power.
Many polities are established by treaty. On occasion, states have chosen—more or less freely—to join together into a new sovereign order,107
have agreed to the creation of a new political entity,108 and have created new
states through agreements with indigenous peoples.109 New Zealand’s
Treaty of Waitangi110 and the set of linking treaties that underpin the European Union provide contrasting stories of the constitutional significance of
treaties. Indeed, it could be argued these polities provide mirror-image
accounts of the possible role accorded to treaties: in New Zealand, Waitangi
was initially ignored by the judges but now is accorded increasing significance, whilst the foundational significance111 of the European Treaties has
decreased—though, of course, has not vanished—over time as it has been
overlaid by caselaw generated by the Court of Justice of the European
Union.112
The signing of the Treaty of Waitangi was a vital historical step towards
the emergence of modern New Zealand. The Treaty of Waitangi was drawn
up between the imperial Crown and a number of Maori chiefs, and, though
its meaning is disputed, it is generally regarded as embodying an agreement
by the chiefs to transfer sovereignty to the imperial Crown in return for
Crown protection of their lands and peoples.113 The Treaty was subsequently breached in a number of different ways. Hanna Wilberg has argued
that the “original” breach was the passing of the Treaty obligations from the
imperial Crown—which was a party to Waitangi—to the New Zealand
Crown—which was not.114 The imperial Crown had undertaken to protect
the Maori people and had broken that duty by renouncing its right to govern
New Zealand. Allied to this “original” breach were many other violations, as
107 As, for example, with the Union with Scotland Act 1706, through which England
and Scotland created Great Britain. See An Act for an Union of the Two Kingdoms of
England and Scotland 1706, 6 Ann. c. 11 (Gr. Brit.).
108 See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 503–64 (2d
ed. 2006).
109 See id. at 268–70 (“In principle, then, it was a condition for the valid acquisition of
inhabited territory that the indigenous rulers or peoples consented by treaty or
otherwise.”).
110 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (N.Z.).
111 F.M. BROOKFIELD, WAITANGI & INDIGENOUS RIGHTS: REVOLUTION, LAW & LEGITIMATION 151–58 (1999).
112 See infra notes 130–35 and accompanying text.
113 See BROOKFIELD, supra note 111, at 108–35.
114 Hanna Wilberg, Facing Up to the Original Breach of the Treaty, 2007 N.Z. L. REV. 527,
528.
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the New Zealand government failed to respect the Treaty in its acquisition
and confiscation of Maori lands.115
Faced with this state of affairs, the courts—and the other constitutional
institutions of New Zealand—had three options: first, to ignore the Treaty of
Waitangi altogether; second, to treat the Treaty as possessing constitutional
significance but deny it foundational constitutional authority; and third, to
identify the Treaty as New Zealand’s foundational constitutional document,
one which limited the constitutionally legitimate range of actions of the New
Zealand state, a limit that would extend to the courts and legislature.
The courts initially disregarded the Treaty. In Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington,116 Chief Justice James Prendergast secured a place in legal history by
describing the Treaty as “a simple nullity” entered into by “primitive barbarians.” Whilst this decision has been both widely criticised and distinguished,117 Prendergast’s treatment of the Treaty may be contestable, but it
was, perhaps, not surprising.118 Even if the Treaty were a valid international
instrument—which Prendergast rejected—it would still not have limited the
Imperial Parliament under imperial law. The crucial decision in the case was
the determination of the source of the court’s legitimacy: once Prendergast
had decided that he sat as a judge of the imperial system, the capacity of
Waitangi to limit the Imperial Parliament and, subsequently, the capacity of
the Imperial Parliament to confer unfettered lawmaking power upon the
New Zealand legislature, was not in any doubt.119
Although recent judicial decisions have followed Parata in declining to
treat Waitangi as a limit on the state,120 they have increasingly accorded the
Treaty constitutional and, more specifically, legal, significance. Waitangi has
come to be used as an interpretative tool: where possible, statutes will be
construed in a manner that conforms to the principles set out in the
Treaty.121 The Treaty has also had a broader political impact, leading to the
creation of the Waitangi Tribunal, a body established to hear disputes over its
powers.122 The Tribunal does not issue binding rulings, but makes recommendations to the government.123 As F.M. Brookfield has commented, there
is an apparent paradox in the Waitangi Tribunal’s position: it is a body set up
to inquire into and help resolve breaches of the Treaty, yet the legal order
115 Id. at 544 (citing Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (N.Z.)).
116 Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington [1877] NZSC 72, at 78 (N.Z.).
117 See, e.g., David V. Williams, Judges and Judging in Colonial New Zealand: Where Did
Native Title Fit In?, in JUDGES AND JUDGING IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL
LAW: FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 306 (Paul Brand & Joshua Getzler eds., 2012).
118 OLIVER, supra note 83, at 30–36.
119 See generally Richard Ekins, The Treaty of Waitangi and the Constitution of New
Zealand (Jan. 20, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
120 See Te Heuheu Tukino v. Aotea Dist. Maori Land Bd. [1941] NZLR 590 (PC) (N.Z.); F
M Brookfield, Constitutional Law, 1993 N.Z. RECENT L. REV. 278, 282; see also Kerensa Johnston, The Treaty of Waitangi, 2004 N.Z. L. REV. 613, 628–30.
121 See, e.g., N.Z. Maori Council v. Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA) (N.Z.).
122 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (N.Z.).
123 Id. § 5.
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that established the Tribunal is, itself, dependent upon a breach of the
Treaty.124
Whilst there is little or no dispute amongst New Zealand’s courts125 over
the extent to which Waitangi provides a foundational constraint, this has not
prevented some from arguing that New Zealand’s lawmaking capacity is
restricted by the Treaty.126 This echoes a similar argument that has been
run, from time to time, in the United Kingdom, where it has sometimes been
claimed that the Act of Union between England and Scotland constrains the
legislative scope of the United Kingdom Parliament, at least in Scots Law.127
It is hard to imagine, but just conceivable, that Chief Justice Prendergast
could have declared that he sat as a judge in a system that had been established and validated by the Treaty of Waitangi. He could have declared that
the Treaty limited the imperial Crown and, in consequence, New Zealand’s
constitutional institutions. Such a decision would have located the court in
an alternative legal order: it would not have been an emanation of the imperial legal order, but, rather, a court set within an autonomous New Zealand
system that interacts with that legal order. Perhaps some of the arguments
over the Treaty of Waitangi should be seen as calls for a shift of this type: a
“revolution”128 in which the judges revise their understanding of the basis of
their authority.129
The significance of treaties as foundational documents may be disputable in the context of the state, where it could be argued the emergence of the
state eclipses the treaty as the source of constitutional legitimacy, but in international organizations, most notably the European Union, treaties indisputably possess continuing constitutional authority. The European Union is a
body of limited jurisdiction: its institutions only possess the powers conferred
upon them by the Member States.130 Nevertheless, the European Court of
Justice (now renamed the Court of Justice of the European Union) has still
been required to make a number of decisions about the legal significance of
the underlying treaties. Like many constitutional courts of emerging states,
the ECJ was compelled to address questions of its own legitimacy and compe124 BROOKFIELD, supra note 111, at 151–52.
125 However, the Waitangi Tribunal has occasionally used language that suggests a
foundational role for the Treaty. See Ekins, supra note 119, at 16.
126 See, e.g., Moana Jackson, The Treaty and the Word: The Colonization of Maori Philosophy,
in JUSTICE, ETHICS, AND NEW ZEALAND SOCIETY 1 (Graham Oddie & Roy W. Perrett eds.,
1992); Jessica Orsman, Note, The Treaty of Waitangi as an Exercise of Maori Constituent Power,
43 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 345 (2012).
127 See, e.g., Gibson v. Lord Advocate [1975] Sess. Cas. 136, (1975) (Scot.); MacCormick
v. Lord Advocate (1953) SC 396 (CS) (Scot.); see also NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING
SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH 49–62 (1999);
T.B. Smith, The Union of 1707 as Fundamental Law, 1957 PUB. L. 99.
128 See BROOKFIELD, supra note 111, at 169–74.
129 See Wilberg, supra note 114, at 549–50 (discussing this idea).
130 Matthew Parish, International Courts and the European Legal Order, 23 EUR. J. INT’L
LAW 141, 141 (2012).
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tence in the early years of its existence. In Van Gend en Loos131 the European
Court of Justice declared that the Member States had, by signing the Treaty
of Rome establishing the European Economic Community, limited their sovereign rights and had created a new legal order, one that conferred new legal
rights on the citizens of these states, which they could vindicate in their
domestic courts. This case was quickly followed by Costa v. Ente Nazionale
Energia Elettrica.132 Costa developed the idea of European law as a discrete
legal order, one that was binding both on and within Member States.133 Not
only was European law accessible from within the legal orders of Member
States, it also took precedence over conflicting national law.134 A national
judge faced with conflict between national and European law should, therefore, accord priority to the latter—even if the national rule possessed constitutional status.135
The decisions made by the European Court of Justice, articulating its
understanding of the significance of its foundational Treaty,136 came as a
surprise to some of the Member States who had only recently signed that
document,137 a surprise that was reflected in the decisions of many national
courts, discussed earlier in this Article.138 Many had assumed that the court
would conceptualise the European legal order in terms of a standard international law model. Under this model, the Treaty would bind the states in
international law, but would not—without further action—be legally effective
within domestic legal orders: national sovereignty would have been
preserved.139
Treaties, like state constitutions, are legal instruments that simultaneously empower and constrain. In both the New Zealand and European
examples, the courts were asked to determine their position under the treaty.
In New Zealand, the question was, and is, whether Waitangi provided a constitutional foundation for the state that both legitimated and constrained
courts and other constitutional institutions. In the European Community,
the fundamental status of the Treaty was not in question, but its implications
were: the court’s existence and jurisdiction clearly depended on the Treaty,
but the scope of that jurisdiction was in doubt. In each case, there was no
higher body to which the courts could refer the question. The judges must
decide on the scope of their own authority: whether, and how, the treaties
shape the powers of the court.
131 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
132 Costa v. Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica, 1964 E.C.R. 587.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für
Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1152–55.
136 See supra notes 131–36 and accompanying text.
137 See generally J.H.H. Weiler & Ulrich R. Haltern, The Autonomy of the Community Legal
Order—Through the Looking Glass, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411 (1996).
138 See supra notes 10–17 and accompanying text.
139 Parish, supra note 130, at 141.
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CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

The examples of the exceptional role of the judge discussed in the previous Part are remarkable, but, in a sense, also not all that surprising. All legal
orders must have a starting point, and so all courts will be compelled to consider—or must resolve to studiously ignore—questions about the origins of
the legal order and their own position within it. A further, and often more
dramatic, set of examples arises when there is the possibility that it might be
expedient for the court to bring about a change to the legal order that the
legal order, at present, does not permit. In these instances, there is a constitutional crisis that the judges may have the power to bring to an end, but only
by acting outside of their legal powers.
A.

Coups and Courts

Courts are often asked to consider the legal status of regimes established
after coups.140 Following a coup, most of the state’s constitutional structures
are left unchanged: the usurpers—who are normally a section of the military—claim to have taken control of some of the offices of state, and intend
to make use of pre-existing state institutions.141 In these circumstances, the
endorsement, or cooperation, of the courts will often be desired by the
usurper.142 Such a decision may help the usurper present herself as the protector, rather than the destroyer, of the constitution.143 This symbolism may
be reassuring to the leaders of the coup, but, more importantly, may also
enhance the perception of their legitimacy amongst their supporters and
within constitutional institutions more generally.144 This perception, in
turn, may make it more likely that other elements of the constitutional order
will cooperate with the usurpers. Consequently, after a coup, the judges have
a certain amount of political capital that they can use to condition the actions
of the usurpers.145 The difficulty faced by the court is that the act of usurpation seems, almost by definition, to run contrary to the state’s existing legal
structures: to ask the court to legitimate the act of a usurper may seem to
amount to asking the judges to render lawful that which is, at the time of the
decision, unlawful.
Faced with a coup, the first question faced by the judges is whether the
pre-existing constitutional order continues, or whether the coup amounts to
140 For a broad discussion, see Mahmud, supra note 74, at 51–52 (“Often in the wake of
coups d’etat, courts in common law jurisdictions are called upon to resolve issues of the
survival of the constitutional order and the validity, legitimacy, and legislative power of
usurper regimes.”).
141 See generally Ozan O. Varol, The Democratic Coup d’État, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 291
(2012) (describing the role of the military in coups d’état and transitions in the form of
government).
142 Id. at 318–19.
143 Id.
144 Mahmud, supra note 74, at 120.
145 Varol, supra note 141, at 318–19.
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a break in constitutional continuity: a “revolution” in Kelsenian terms.146 In
one of the earliest cases on revolutionary legality, State v. Dosso,147 the
Supreme Court of Pakistan purported to apply Kelsen’s model of a legal
order to the question. Kelsen’s model of a legal order asserts that each legal
order possesses a single supreme rule: the grundnorm.148 The grundnorm
plays at least two roles in Kelsen’s legal philosophy.149 First, it enables actors
within the legal system to identify proposed norms as valid legal norms; the
grundnorm identifies a founding constitution that, in its turn, provides a set of
rules that could be used to identify and validate lower-level legal norms.150
Each separate legal system, consequently, has its own, distinct grundnorm.151
Secondly, the grundnorm acts as the presupposition of validity that enables
legal reasoning.152 Challenges to the validity of a legal rule may be countered by pointing to a higher norm that empowered the creation of the lower
norm, a process that could continue all the way up the legal chain to the
grundnorm—a norm whose legal validity cannot be demonstrated by reference to another rule, but whose validity has to be presumed to enable legal
reasoning. In a revolution the grundnorm changes: there is a break in legal
continuity—the changes brought about by the revolutionaries cannot be
traced back to the old grundnorm, and a new legal order is established.153 In
Dosso, this aspect of Kelsen’s jurisprudence was relied upon to validate the
actions of the usurpers.154 According to the court, the actions of the usurpers had been effective: they had transformed power into authority, and, as a
result of this, the grundnorm had changed.155 In a remarkable ruling, the
judges found that because the revolution had been successful it was, itself, a
law-creating fact.156 The legality of the usurpation should be judged by reference to its own success, and not by reference to the old constitution.157
The approach of the court in Dosso has been criticised at a number of
levels. Some of this criticism turns on the correctness of Kelsen’s account of
146 HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 209 (Max Knight trans., 1967) [hereinafter
KELSEN, PURE THEORY].
147 State v. Dosso, (1958) PLD (SC) 533, 1 Pak. L. Rep. 849 (Pak.); Mahmud, supra note
74, at 54–57.
148 KELSEN, PURE THEORY, supra note 146, at 8; see also HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY
OF LAW AND STATE, 110–23, 395–96 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1948) [hereinafter KELSEN,
GENERAL THEORY].
149 J.W. Harris, When and Why Does the Grundnorm Change?, 29 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 103,
106–07 (1971); see also Catherine Richmond, Preserving the Identity Crisis: Autonomy, System
and Sovereignty in European Law, 16 LAW & PHIL. 377, 392–94 (1997).
150 KELSEN, PURE THEORY, supra note 146, at 198–201.
151 Hans Kelsen, Professor Stone and the Pure Theory of Law, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1128, 1149
(1965).
152 KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 148, at 116–17.
153 See id. at 117; KELSEN, PURE THEORY, supra note 146, at 209.
154 See State v. Dosso, (1958) PLD (SC) 533, 1 Pak. L. Rep. 849, 856–58.
155 See id. at 858.
156 Id.
157 The reasoning in State v. Dosso was applied in a number of other Commonwealth
“revolutionary legality” cases. See Mahmud, supra note 74, at 57–60.
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a legal order. As many have argued, tying the identity of a legal order to a
single, foundational rule is overly reductionist.158 Legal orders are networks
of rules and institutions, and their identity rests on a broad range of these
features—an unlawful change to a single rule, or to a number of rules, need
not trigger the creation of a new legal order. But even if Kelsen’s model is
embraced, the decision in Dosso is far from inevitable. Faced with the act of a
usurper, the Kelsenian judge has the option of upholding the pre-existing
legal order; the old grundnorm could be reasserted and the usurpation
declared unlawful. Indeed, on Kelsen’s account, the decision in Dosso
appears to effect what it seeks to prove: it is the decision of the judges that
brought about the creation of the new legal order, not the act of creating a
new legal order that has brought about the decision.159
Even if we set aside doubts about the reasoning in Dosso, the move from
the decision that the usurpation established a new constitutional or legal
order to the conclusion that the court was required to hold that the usurpers
were legitimated by the new system was too quick. Having decided that the
old legal order had been brought to an end, the position of the court was
thrown into doubt; it was, after all, the old legal order that established the
court and empowered the judges. The court could have concluded that the
extinction of the old legal order extinguished the court, too. It is sometimes
argued that a principled judge, faced with a usurper, should resign rather
than attempt to decide the case. Dosso opens a more radical possibility:
rather than resign, those who had held the office of judge could decide that
the coup has removed the legal apparatus establishing the judge and the
court. Having so concluded, all that would be left would be a group of people sitting in a nicely decorated room: the institution of the judge and the
court would have vanished, with no judge left to rule on the lawfulness of the
revolution.
Having concluded that the old legal order had ceased to exist, the former judges of the old order—now effectively private individuals—could
accept the implied invitation of the usurper to become judges of a new legal
order. If we take Dosso at face value, this was effectively what was decided in
that case.160 But as judges of a new legal order there is no reason why the
court must, as it did in Dosso, provide unqualified acceptance of the usurper’s
entitlement to govern. As we have seen, courts at the start of constitutional
orders often exercise a creative role: setting the constitutional boundaries of
state institutions and determining the principles on which the state rests. As
judges of a new constitutional order, the supreme court in Dosso had wide—
even legally unlimited—latitude to decide which of the doctrines of Paki158 BARBER, supra note 50, at 145–71 (2010); JOHN FINNIS, Revolutions and Continuity of
Law, in 4 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: COLLECTED ESSAYS 407, 413 (2011); JOSEPH RAZ, The Identity
of Legal Systems, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 78, 99 (1979).
159 This aspect of Dosso has not been followed by subsequent Pakistani cases on revolutionary legality. See, e.g., Jilani v. Gov’t of the Punjab, (1972) PLD (SC) 139 (Pak.); Bhutto
v. Army Chief of Staff, (1977) PLD (SC) 657 (Pak.).
160 See generally Dosso, 1 Pak. L. Rep. (SC) 849.
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stan’s former legal order continued to constrain the usurpers. In effect, they
had an opportunity to bargain with the usurpers, a chance to protect certain
aspects of Pakistan’s constitution in return for legitimating the usurpation.
The second option open to judges following a coup is to declare that the
pre-existing legal order continues to apply. Following this decision, four
groups of strategies present themselves to the court. First, the court may
reject the coup entirely, declaring it unlawful. Second, the court may decide
that the coup is legitimated by the rules of the old constitutional order, and
those who have brought about the coup have become the lawful government.
Third, the court may attempt a middle path: treating the coup as lawful, but
setting limits on the duration the leaders of the coup can lawfully hold office.
Fourth, the court could declare the legality of the coup a nonjusticiable question: the existing legal order continues, but the court declines to rule on the
constitutional status of the usurper.
In some circumstances, the first of these strategies may be open to the
judges: it may be possible for the court to re-assert the old legal order and, in
so doing, bring the coup to an end. In Republic of Fiji v. Prasad,161 the Fijian
Court of Appeal ruled that an attempted coup was unlawful, and the purported revocation of the prior constitution was ineffective. The decision echoes that of the Privy Council case of Madzimbamuto,162 discussed earlier, but
this time the judges prevailed: the coup was brought to an end, and the old
regime was re-established.163 The latitude accorded to the judges in Prasad
was unusual. Where a coup is sufficiently successful for its leaders to apply to
the court for confirmation of their legitimacy, it is unlikely—though, as
Prasad shows, not impossible—that these leaders will accept a wholesale judicial rejection of their actions. On the other hand, it is also possible that
where the leaders of a coup feel it politically necessary to ask a court to legitimate their actions, their political situation may be sufficiently weak that they
will bow to a judicial rebuke.
The court in Prasad identified two principles that Commonwealth courts
have used to test the legality of the acts of usurpers: the doctrine of effectiveness and the doctrine of necessity.164 The doctrine of effectiveness has its
origins in Dosso165 but, unlike Dosso, the conclusion that a coup has been
effective does not require the judge to conclude that a wholly new legal order
has been created. The doctrine is either a principle contained within that
existing legal order, or is, perhaps, a supra-constitutional principle that exists
161 Republic of Fiji v. Prasad, [2001] 2 L.R.C. 743 (CA) (Fiji); see also Nicholas W. Barber, State Necessity and Revolutionary Legality in Fiji, 117 L.Q. REV. 408 (2001); George Williams, The Case That Stopped a Coup? The Rule of Law and Constitutionalism in Fiji, 1 OXFORD
U. COMMW. L.J. 73 (2001).
162 Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1969] 1 AC 645 (PC) (appeal taken from Rhodesia) (UK).
163 See Prasad, 2 L.R.C. at 774.
164 Id. at 760, 770.
165 See Dosso, 1 Pak. L. Rep. (SC) at 858.
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outside the legal order to which the judge can refer.166 Though the court in
Prasad was careful to renounce any political role, asserting that the principle
of efficacy was part of the common law of Fiji, it is hard to see efficacy as
anything other than a principle of political morality in the context of that
legal order.167 The claim that effectiveness is a legal principle runs contrary
to provisions in Fiji’s 1997 constitution: Section 2 asserts that the constitution
is the supreme law of Fiji and invalidates laws that are inconsistent with that
document.168 The doctrine of effectiveness is in conflict with this rule: it
enables, or even requires, the court to declare lawful actions and rules that
are inconsistent with the constitution.
Though the claim of the usurpers ultimately failed, the court identified
two groups of considerations relevant to the application of the doctrine of
effectiveness.169 First, the usurpation must have been successful; it must have
destroyed the possibility of the old order resuming power and the new rulers
must be in control of the territory of the state.170 Second, there must be
evidence of popular acceptance of the new regime; the effectiveness of the
new regime must not merely be based on fear and coercion.171 The best
proof of this acceptance would be through electoral support, though the longevity of the regime would also be significant. This second group of considerations—considerations that relate to the perceived legitimacy of the
regime—is an important development, absent in Dosso. Its significance can
be seen in a number of Commonwealth cases on usurpation, where the test
of effectiveness has been held to require the judges to examine the public’s
attitudes towards the usurpers—assessing whether there has been acceptance
of the coup,172 or, more strongly still, whether the public has consented to
the new regime.173
The doctrine of necessity was also considered, though more briefly, in
Prasad.174 The doctrine of necessity provides a legal basis for action that is
required in order to protect peace, order, and good government.175 Additionally, the person pleading necessity must respect the rights of the citizens
under the constitution, and not aim to effect or consolidate a revolution
under the guise of necessity. The Fijian Court of Appeal rejected the usurpers’ claim of necessity for two closely linked reasons. First, the usurpers did
not intend to protect the 1997 constitution: their aim was rather to remove
166 See Williams, supra note 161, at 91–92.
167 See id. at 86.
168 FIJI CONST. 1997, § 2.
169 See Prasad, 2 L.R.C. at 770.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 See Mahmud, supra note 74, at 76–78 (discussing Liasi v. Attorney General, 1975
C.L.R. 558 (Cyprus)).
173 See id. at 82–84 (discussing an unreported 1977 ruling on the coup in the
Seychelles).
174 Prasad, 2 L.R.C. at 760–62.
175 See id. at 761.
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the 1997 constitution and establish an alternative legal order.176 Second, the
usurpers’ attempts to make permanent changes to the 1997 constitution went
beyond what the doctrine could validate; necessity could have authorized
only temporary measures undertaken with the aim of restoring the 1997
constitution.177
The doctrine of necessity was successfully invoked, and considered at
greater length, in Pakistan’s Military Action Case,178 in which the supreme
court considered the legality of General Pervez Musharraf’s 1999 coup. The
supreme court declined to accept the Army’s claim that the usurpation was
validated by the doctrine of effectiveness, instead invoking the doctrine of
necessity to confer limited legitimacy on the usurpers.179 Two criteria for
necessity can be identified in the judgment. First, the action undertaken by
the usurper must have been required to save the state from extreme evil.180
What counts as extreme evil is a matter for the court, but it seems that threats
to the democratic processes of the constitution are significant and, perhaps,
economic mismanagement and corruption may also be relevant. Furthermore, these evils must be beyond the capacity of regular constitutional institutions to remedy; to satisfy the test of necessity, the welfare of the people
must be better served by armed rule than by suffering the evil.181 Second,
the usurper must return the state to normal constitutional government as
quickly as possible—though, in contrast to the Fijian ruling, there was no
requirement that the usurper intend a return to constitutional government at
the time of the usurpation.182
Setting aside the doctrinal differences between effectiveness and necessity, the political difference, for the court, lies between a doctrine that validates a new constitutional regime within an existing legal order, and a
doctrine that permits a temporary shift in constitutional power. In the latter
instance, the court strikes an implied bargain with the usurper: the usurper is
given a form of legitimacy, but only if there is a commitment to return to
constitutional government. Furthermore, this grant of legitimacy is time-limited: the court can use necessity to set the period in which the usurper can
legitimately exercise power, or can reserve the capacity to revisit the question
of legitimacy at a later date.
The cost of both effectiveness and necessity is that they encourage usurpation and destabilize the constitutional order, encouraging would-be usurpers by opening up the possibility that their actions will be legitimated. Partly
for this reason, Tayyab Mahmud has argued that courts should regard coups
as nonjusticiable, quintessentially political questions that fall outside of the
176 Id. at 760.
177 Id. at 761.
178 Shah v. Musharraf, (2000) PLD (SC) 869 (Pak.).
179 Id. ¶ 4.
180 Id. ¶ 2.
181 Id.
182 Id. ¶ 72.
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realm of the courts.183 In some instances this may be an attractive option,
but in other cases the court may be in a position to mitigate the consequences of the coup. As the Fijian example shows, a court that is prepared to
engage with these questions might be able to bring the coup to an end. This
case is probably an outlier in terms of judicial power, but the modern development of the tests of both effectiveness and necessity may help shape the
way usurpers behave. The effectiveness test now requires some notion of
acceptance or consent from the people of the state: the court will not recognize the constitutional shift in power based purely on force and threats. The
necessity test is time-limited: the best the usurper can hope for is a temporary
conferral of legitimacy by the court.
B.

Cutting the Gordian Knot

Finally, there is a set of crisis cases in which other constitutional institutions have reached a deadlock or impasse. In such cases, courts may take it
upon themselves to cut the Gordian knot—to take up questions, to accept
legal arguments, to issue decisions, or to allow or forbid remedies, in ways
that the courts themselves would ordinarily eschew as legally invalid or
beyond the competence of the courts. In such cases, courts may perceive
themselves as stepping outside of a malfunctioning constitutional order, with
a view to taking extraordinary measures to restore it to ordinary
functioning.184
Let us begin with Cernauskas v. Fletcher, a humble but theoretically interesting example from the Supreme Court of Arkansas, an American state, in
1947.185 A new state statute regulating real property contained a remarkable
clause, according to which “[a]ll laws and parts of laws, and particularly [an
earlier statute], are hereby repealed.”186 Read at face value, the result would
be a legal vacuum in the state of Arkansas—we might imagine pillagers roaming the streets with legal impunity until the legislature could meet to restore
order. This is the point at which even the most hard-bitten textualist
flinches. On a strict textualist view, interpolating words based on what the
legislature would have said, had it been paying attention or thinking clearly,
is a thoroughly illegitimate move—unless perhaps the consequence would be
a lawless vacuum.
Accordingly, the Arkansas Supreme Court blandly, and quite correctly,
observed that, “No doubt the legislature meant to repeal all laws in conflict
with [the new statute], and, by error of the author or the typist, left out the
usual words ‘in conflict herewith’, which we will imply by necessary construction.”187 There is nothing theoretically disreputable about a version of textu183 See Mahmud, supra note 74, at 131–38.
184 Cf. CARL SCHMITT, DICTATORSHIP 20–21 (Michael Hoelzl & Graham Ward trans.,
2014) (defining a temporary or “commissary” dictatorship as opposed to “sovereign”
dictatorship).
185 201 S.W.2d 999 (Ark. 1947).
186 Id. at 1000 (quoting Act 17, 1945 Ark. Acts 30, 34).
187 Id.
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alism that has this sort of catastrophe override. It is legal theory’s equivalent
of a position called threshold deontology in moral theory, which likewise
commands agents to follow prescribed rules unless extreme harms would
ensue.188 From the judicial standpoint, however, the theoretical reputability
of the court’s decision is entirely irrelevant. The pragmatic question is what
the judges in Cernauskas were supposed to do; and they had no real alternative but to do what they did. The only possible judicial decision was the one
that would prevent an implosion of the legal system—what in ordinary parlance, and revealingly, is called an “executive decision.”
A more serious instance, along the same lines, was the Re Manitoba Language Rights decision from the Supreme Court of Canada in 1985.189 The
Constitution Act 1867190 and the Manitoba Act 1870191 required that laws be
enacted and printed in both English-language and French-language versions.
The requirement had not been fully complied with; for generation upon
generation, many laws were enacted in English only. What then was the legal
status of the many noncomplying laws? If they were invalid, a legal vacuum
would result in the affected area. The court issued a Solomonic judgment,
devising an entirely new remedy in order to both uphold the rule of law and
also to ward off chaos.192 The court held the English-only laws invalid, but
“deemed” them temporarily valid until they could be properly translated and
re-enacted.193 This remedy—the delayed judgment of invalidity—has since
become a standard tool in the judicial repertoire in Canada. At its inception,
however, it was born of necessity, in an instance of judicial decisionism, justified if at all by the need to ensure the ongoing functioning of the legal order
in Manitoba.
In U.S. constitutional law, the most recent and most famous decision of
this sort is undoubtedly Bush v. Gore.194 The decision quieted—as a matter of
law, if not of politics—a typhoon of controversy over the votes cast in Florida
during the 2000 presidential election, and in effect awarded victory to the
188 For an extended analysis and defence of threshold deontology, see generally EYAL
ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS, AND MORALITY (2010).
189 Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] S.C.R. 721 (Can.).
190 Constitution Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 § 133 (UK), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app II,
no 5 (Can.).
191 Manitoba Act of 1870, S.C. 1870, c 3, § 23 (Can.).
192 See Peter W. Hogg, Necessity in a Constitutional Crisis, 15 MONASH U. L. REV. 253,
256–57 (1989).
193 Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] S.C.R. at 725.
194 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). Levinson and Balkin deny that Bush v. Gore
amounted to a constitutional crisis at all, seemingly on the ground that it was resolved
speedily by the courts, and that relevant political actors acquiesced without street protests
or “the mobilization of troops.” See Levinson & Balkin, supra note 1, at 744. Needless to
say, on our account that description is unacceptably narrow; it would imply that courts can
never confront constitutional crises at all, even in the coup cases we have discussed, so long
as their decisions are respected ex post. The problem is that ex ante, courts cannot know
whether their decisions will be respected, and it is that feature of the situation that makes it
a crisis from the court’s point of view.
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Republican candidate George W. Bush, who went on to a highly consequential eight-year presidency. The critical disagreement that split the Supreme
Court five to four, on partisan lines, was not whether the recount could proceed under the standards then being used; seven out of nine Justices agreed
that those standards were unconstitutional, because different standards were
being used in different parts of the state, in violation of the Constitution’s
guarantees of equality before the law.195 Rather, the critical issue was remedial—whether or not the Court should immediately shut down the recount.
Looming in the background was the knowledge that, should Florida’s vote
still be undetermined by a date that was rapidly approaching, the election
would be decided by a complex scheme of voting in the U.S. Congress, under
the Constitution and an old statute, the Electoral Count Act of 1887, a
scheme that had never been invoked, whose operation was uncertain, and
that would provide ample scope for partisan shenanigans. Even worse, were
the presidential succession still unresolved by January 20 of 2001, an Acting
President would have had to be appointed—and due to a bizarre constellation of circumstances, the appointee might have been the Secretary of the
Treasury, Lawrence Summers, a man notable for his sundry powers to alienate all.196
The five-Justice majority acted decisively to prevent (what it doubtless
saw as) a descent into partisan and institutional chaos, ordering an immediate halt to all recounts. The opinion spoke in ordinary legal terms, with one
critical and revealing exception: the majority, quite remarkably, explicitly
attempted to eliminate the precedential force of its own opinion, writing that
“[o]ur consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem
of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.”197 One of us has argued elsewhere that an attempt of this sort to write
opinions without precedential force is inherently doomed, because it is ultimately up to the future to decide what will or will not count as a precedent.198 But the validity of that claim is neither here nor there for present
purposes. The majority’s very attempt betrays a view that its action was exceptional—an attempt to step outside the ordinary bounds of judicial action on
an extraordinary occasion.
Plausibly, Bush v. Gore is best seen as a cautionary tale about exceptional
interventions by courts, explicitly or (in this case) implicitly justified by pragmatic necessity. The problem is that the Court’s intervention was in fact
quite possibly premature and unnecessary. Many constitutional crises in
American history, including many electoral controversies, have been resolved
politically, despite the pressures of partisan deadlock. As James Bryce
observed, partisan deadlock is a temporary and short-run phenomenon;
195
196

Bush, 531 U.S. at 98.
RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 138 (2001).
197 Bush, 531 U.S. at 109.
198 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
1743, 1770–71 (2013).
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when the issue is highly salient, democratic public opinion becomes engaged
and eventually throws its irresistible weight into the balance in favor of one
party or the other.199 The other party backs down and gives away the lion’s
share of the concessions, and the dispute is resolved upon more or less
favorable terms.
Of course no one will ever observe the counterfactual; it is impossible to
know whether allowing the election to be thrown into the House of Representatives would have produced a partisan collision of constitution-wrecking
proportions. Judge Richard Posner defended Bush v. Gore as a “pragmatic
solution to a looming national crisis.”200 Spinning out a “worst-case scenario” in which the “[t]he Constitution puts the counting of electoral votes in
the hands of Congress with no hint of a judicial role,” Posner concluded that
the Court had no option but to intervene, in a bid to prevent chaos.201 This
is of course the classical justification cited by men on white horses, who claim
that the ordinary operation of democratic institutions cannot be trusted to
avert the worst possibilities.
An alternative possibility, however, is that allowing the prescribed institutional processes to unfold would have resulted in a more enduring political
settlement. Bush’s first term, at least, was conducted under a kind of haze of
constitutional and political illegitimacy arising from the very circumstances
of his quasi-election; this was emphatically one of the circumstances that the
Justices ought to have taken into account. As Ronald Dworkin observed in
reply to Posner’s argument, it is a curious pragmatism that fails to consider
all relevant costs and benefits of all possible courses of action,202 including
the legitimacy costs of pragmatism itself.
As a temporary expedient, justified by an implicit claim of necessity, the
merits of Bush v. Gore are highly dubious, and at best unclear. But no one
doubts that it must be justified, if at all, in terms of this sort. The basis for
Bush v. Gore, if there is one, can only be extra-legal; it is that extraordinary
action was (perceived to be) necessary to prevent system-wide chaos.
IV. ON BOOTSTRAPPING

AND

DECISIONISM

Our principal aim has been to offer a taxonomy and analysis of exceptional adjudication by constitutional courts. In other words, we have
attempted first to describe what courts actually do in various types of exceptional cases, and second to indicate some means by which, given their goals
(or the goals of the median or controlling voters within these multimember
199 See Adrian Vermeule, “Government by Public Opinion”: Bryce’s Theory of the Constitution
24 (Harv. Pub. L. Working Paper No. 11-13, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=1809794.
200 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 322 (2003).
201 See Richard A. Posner, The 2000 Presidential Election: A Statistical and Legal Analysis, 12
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 28–29 (2004).
202 Ronald Dworkin, Introduction to A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V.
GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1, 31–43 (Ronald Dworkin ed.,
2002).
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bodies), they might best proceed. Let us step back from the subcases and try
to see the picture as a whole.
In a range of settings, courts face problems that press the limits of the
normal legal order, either because there is an immediate crisis that threatens
the existence of a given constitutional regime (Part III), or because there is a
transition between constitutional regimes (Part II), or simply because the
courts are challenged to explain the grounds, scope, and limits of the authority of actors within the constitutional regimes—either themselves or others
(Part I). In any of these cases, dilemmas of bootstrapping inevitably arise.
Where the very grounds of the constitution’s authority are themselves challenged, it is not straightforward for courts to know how to give any response
at all qua courts. Like a person struggling to rise out of quicksand, who has
no firm ground from which to push upwards, there is no theoretical bedrock
on which courts may stand.
Strictly theoretical and jurisprudential approaches to the bootstrapping
problem seem doomed to fail. Our approach is very different. We have
attempted to view the problems in their natural habitats, as it were, by showing that bootstrapping is a real-world problem that arises in a surprising
range of cases, with surprisingly high frequency. And we have attempted to
show that in exceptional cases, courts invariably resort to a kind of constitutionally inflected decisionism. Above all, they do not succumb to paralysis, but
instead draw upon general principles of constitutionalism and pragmatic
judgments in some uncertain and heavily circumstantial mix. This constitutional decisionism is of course thoroughly “political,” but it is not political in
the same way that, say, decisions by the central committee of a political party
are political. Rather, it draws upon the distinctive training, knowledge, and
political circumstances of courts. We will conclude by offering some generalizations about the sources and methods courts draw upon in the course of
constitutional decisionism.
A.

Principles of Constitutionalism

In U.S. constitutional law, scholars have argued that there are no freestanding “principles” of constitutionalism, such as the separation of powers,
federalism, or democracy.203 And, of course, as a legal matter this must be
the case: legal principles, whether labeled “constitutional” or not, only exist if
they are to be found within legal sources. Consequently, as a matter of law,
there are only constitutional provisions, which instantiate or protect these
principles to some degree or in some ways, but not fully and not in all possible ways.
It is arguable, though, that law does not exhaust the range of considerations that apply to judges. Sometimes other considerations—including
moral principles that are not found within legal sources—may be relevant.
Where these moral principles have a special connection to the structuring of
203 See John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1
(2014).
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the state it may be appropriate to think of them as principles of constitutionalism: principles that may be reflected in the legal order, but which are not
subsumed by their reflection.204 The constitution is a network of particular
deals, compromises, and tradeoffs, such that an attempt to generalize principles and use them in constitutional interpretation will inevitably amount to a
half-truth: the best that can be done is to identify factors and principles
judges should consider, whilst recognizing that they rarely point towards simple or obvious answers.
Whatever merit that argument might have in ordinary constitutional
contexts, it has even greater merit in the extraordinary contexts we have
examined. These cases arise, necessarily and by definition, when it is imperative that courts resolve cases whose outcome is radically underdetermined by
standard legal sources. (By “resolve,” we do not at all mean that the court is
simply to impose its own vision of the good. Shortly we will urge that courts
in extraordinary situations should also display an extraordinary degree of
political sensitivity and epistemic humility.) Such cases lie at a kind of constitutional frontier, such that multiple competing principles of constitutionalism will often be implicated more or less directly. Indeed these cases are
often “hard cases” precisely because, and to the extent that, there are competing principles of constitutionalism in play. Constitutional decisionism
then amounts not to principle-free political decisionmaking (if there is such
a thing), but an attempt to reconcile, balance, and accommodate constitutional imperatives, in a kind of optimization of principles.205 An example is
the Manitoba language rights litigation, in which the Supreme Court of
Canada used the expedient of a temporarily delayed judgment of invalidity to
trade off, and accommodate, competing imperatives of nondiscrimination
and the viability of the system of extant laws.206
One of the most significant considerations that applies to courts in these
“bootstrapping” situations is what might be termed the principle of effectiveness: the requirement that the constitution, and through it, the state, be structured in such a way that it can operate successfully. The judges ought, and
often do, strive to ensure that the capacity of state institutions, including
courts, to act is preserved and fostered. This can be most clearly seen in cases
like Manitoba and Cernauskas, where the court was faced with an apparently
clear legal issue that, if the court applied the law, would prove a disaster for
the state. But many of the other situations discussed in this Article can also
be seen as instances in which the principle of effectiveness is in play.
Where the court is faced with a changed political consensus about the
basis of the constitutional order, it will often be appropriate for the judges to
alter the legal side of a constitution to accommodate this new agreement.
There is little point—and potentially much cost—in the courts holding to
204 See generally N.W. Barber, Constitutionalism: Negative and Positive, 38 DUBLIN U. L.J.
249 (2015).
205 Cf. ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE CONSTITUTION OF RISK 52 (2014) (defending an optimizing approach to constitutional tradeoffs).
206 See Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] S.C.R. 721 (Can.).
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the older settlement. The Ma Wai-Kwan case is a particularly clear example
of this: for the Hong Kong courts to have ignored the transfer of power from
Britain to China would have been unimaginably foolish.207 Many of the
autochthony cases fall into this category. They are legally interesting—as this
Article has argued, there is no legal justification open to the courts in these
situations—but they are politically boring. As state officials, the correct
course of action for the judges was obvious: the principle of effectiveness
required the acceptance of the new political consensus.
In other instances, the court creates space in which a new political consensus can emerge by introducing the potential for change into the law. The
ambiguities surveyed in the Australian examples, and the later Hong Kong
cases, show judges—perhaps deliberately—introducing flexibility into the
constitution to accommodate the ways in which the political consensus may
develop.
The principle of effectiveness may also require, or weigh towards, the
court empowering bodies to create constitutional structures in fledgling
states. Mizrahi Bank, Marbury v. Madison, and, perhaps, Van Gend en Loos
were cases in which courts empowered bodies to develop the constitutional
order. Mizrahi Bank empowered the Knesset to entrench laws and, in so
doing, create constitutional structures that could regulate future generations
of Israel’s politics. Marbury made the American Constitution judicially
enforceable, empowering both state courts and lower federal courts to
enforce it as against the federal government. Whilst in Van Gend en Loos, the
court created structures that would help ensure the effectiveness of Union
institutions.
It would be a mistake to equate the principle of effectiveness with a
crude defence of stability. Evil constitutional orders—like North Korea—
may be stable, but they are not structures that help the state to flourish or
promote overall well-being. Rendering the constitution effective may also
require the preservation of democratic structures and other institutional
arrangements that contribute to flourishing. The principle of effectiveness
engages with other principles of constitutionalism; courts in the exceptional
situations discussed in this Article may seek to protect or foster these features
of the state. In those cases in which the German Constitutional Court
defines the relationship between the German Constitution and European
law, this motivation is rendered explicit. The German Constitutional Court
has upheld the primacy of the German Constitution over European law to
protect, at least in part, the democratic structures of the German state. Similarly, in the coup cases the courts have sometimes used their position to pressure usurpers into respecting key elements of the constitutional order. In
Pakistan’s Military Action Case the court effectively bargained with the usurpers, granting limited approval of their actions in return for the preservation
of features of Pakistan’s constitutional structures.
207

See Hong Kong v. Ma Wai-Kwan, [1997] H.K.L.R.D. 761 (C.A.) (H.K.).
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Political Sensitivity

In the extraordinary cases we have examined, the necessity for decision
is thrust upon the courts. It does not at all follow, however, that there is any
necessity for the court to make a decision strictly according to its own lights,
as it thinks best. Rather, precisely because of the extraordinary character of
the occasion, prudence counsels that courts should consult a wider spectrum
of views and opinions than it otherwise would, and indeed that courts should
display greater openness to arguments and considerations that would ordinarily be classed as “political.” And indeed that is what we observe, as courts
unavoidably forced to decide exceptional cases—and thus unable to resort to
the techniques of avoidance, delay, and modesty that go under the label of
“the passive virtues”208—tend to relax rules for participation, allowing
extraordinary interventions by public parties, briefs by amici curiae, and
other expanded informational inputs.
The basic reason for this openness to the political is that ambient public
opinion will be more influential in determining the constraints on feasible
actions open to the court and in determining whether the court’s decision
will create an enduring settlement. Ordinary cases often lack salience to public opinion and this gives elites, such as judges, greater freedom of action in a
political sense, although the legal materials will often prove more constraining. In extraordinary cases, the situation is reversed. The legal materials radically underdetermine outcomes, affording judges greater freedom on
that margin, but salience is increased and the decision is far more likely to
attract the attention of general public opinion writ large—what James Bryce
described as the irresistible power of the sovereign master in all democratic
polities.209
Public opinion is doubtless sometimes malleable, and indeed partly an
endogenous product of what judges do, rather than representing a strictly
exogenous constraint. But that is more likely to be true in the long run. In
the short run, the clear view of a clear national majority on a salient question
is irresistible, as James Fitzjames Stephen argued.210 In many of the cases
discussed in the first Part of this Article, the political consensus was clear:
within the Member States of the European Union there is little eagerness to
accept European law as trumping national constitutions, and the granting of
constitutional autonomy to New Zealand and Australia was endorsed by the
people of those territories and by the British state. Sensible judges, who want
their decisions in such cases to create stable and enduring settlements rather
than to provoke a political backlash or to prove evanescent, will think twice
about political constraints and political reactions—even if they believe that
208 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
BAR OF POLITICS 111 (2d ed. 1986).
209 See Vermeule, supra note 199, at 17.
210 James Fitzjames Stephen, Parliamentary Government, 23 CONTEMP. REV. 1, 1–19,
165–81 (1873); see also Adrian Vermeule, The Force of Majority Rule, in MAJORITY DECISIONS:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 132 (Stephanie Novak & Jon Elster eds., 2014).
THE
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this sort of consideration is no part of the judicial role in ordinary cases. This
constraint is the flipside of the significance of the role of political consensus,
discussed in the previous Section. Not only is it right—in many instances—
for the court to seek to give effect to a settled political consensus within the
constitution, a court that ignores such a clear consensus will struggle to maintain its authority.
Where there is a settled political consensus, the institutional implications are clear: the judge should normally seek to give constitutional effect to
this broad agreement. But in some of our examples public opinion is
divided, and divided in an interesting way. Sometimes, there is a dispute
about who constitutes the public. In the Irish and Hong Kong cases—and
perhaps in the Rhodesian case, too—there was an underlying dispute about
who constituted the “public” and, in consequence, where the judge should
look to identify a putative consensus. In the Irish example, from the Privy
Council’s perspective both the Westminster and Irish polities were relevant to
ascertaining any such consensus—whereas for the Irish courts, it was the Irish
people alone whose voices mattered. In Hong Kong, the constitutional ambiguities about the relationship between that territory and the Mainland
echo—or are generated by—ambiguities over the extent to which the Hong
Kong people consider themselves to be part of the Chinese political order.
In these cases, then, public opinion and political consensus are relevant, but
it may fall to the judge to decide what “the public” should be for these purposes, as well as whether a broad consensus exists within this group. Here,
the judge must reflect on the boundaries of the political unit—the group
whose views should count towards the decision—and the judge may be led
back to the questions of effectiveness discussed in the previous Section: What
boundaries are most likely to enable the polity to function successfully, and
how likely is it that the judges’ decision on this question will stand?
Given the importance of public opinion, judges deciding these
extraordinary cases should be willing to consult a far broader range of
sources than they ordinarily do. At a minimum, they should be willing to
accept submissions from a greater variety of interested political actors in a
greater variety of forms—not merely briefs amicus curiae, but official letters
and public statements of position should all be fair game. At a maximum,
judges should rely upon whatever informal data they find useful for assessing
the likely consequences for public opinion of ruling in one way or another.
Lon Fuller satirized such practices by creating a “Judge Handy” who wrote
opinions based on public opinion polls,211 but Fuller’s logic was weak and his
conclusion impractical. His logic was weak because he confused the issue of
decisionmaking with the very different issue of transparency. The proposition
that judges should take account of all relevant information about ambient
public opinion says nothing at all about whether judges should discuss or cite
such information. Fuller’s conclusion was impractical because there is no
real alternative to political sensitivity in extraordinary, highly salient cases.
211

Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 637 (1949).
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Where the foundations of the constitutional order are in play, to act in a
blind and heedless fashion, oblivious to aroused public opinion and to the
political consequences of decision, is to court disaster.
The issue of transparency arises in a second way in many of these foundational cases. In a recent book, Oren Gross and Fionnuala Nı́ Aoláin argue
that where emergencies require extra-legal action from officials, this should
be done openly.212 Officials should explain why they felt it was necessary to
act outside the law, in the hopes that the legislature will validate their conduct after the fact. Their argument aims to accommodate the need—hopefully, a rare need—for extra-legal acts, whilst also creating a constitutional
structure to review the propriety of those actions.
Whatever the merits of this approach, it is far harder to implement when
the court is the institution considering acting in this manner. It is likely that
a significant part of the practical power of the court comes from its assertion
that it is declaring what the law is, that it is not merely inventing new legal
rules. The public—if not legal scholars—may believe that the decisions of
courts should be respected because the judges have used their legal expertise
to discover pre-existing, pre-agreed answers to disputes. In many of the cases
in this Article, the efficacy of the court’s decision might be undermined if the
judges admitted that they lacked a legal basis for their decision. Indeed, in
the coup cases, the whole rationale of the case turned on the capacity of the
courts to grant or withhold legitimacy. If, after a coup, a court seeks to
engage with the usurpers—perhaps in order to preserve, as far as possible,
the positive features of the old system—it embarks on a task that, whilst having the potential to bring enormous rewards, also presents serious institutional challenges. If the court is discovered to have entered into covert
discussions with the usurpers—even if these “negotiations” are conducted
through hints and signals during the trial—the exposure of the raw politics
behind its decision may render its judgment less effective. And in those cases
involving the identification of the locus of sovereignty, the court might risk
its authority if it admitted that there was only one outcome open to it, or if it
confessed that the choice was, in essence, a political one. And, as we suggested with reference to Bush v. Gore, it is pragmatically impossible for a court
to take consequential action whilst ensuring that it creates no precedent for
the future. Whatever the court does, the future may decide to treat that
action as a precedent, de jure or de facto; the current court lacks control
over the matter. In these exceptional cases, then, there may be an argument
for caution in the extent to which judges are open about the reasons that
motivate their decisions. Whilst the court should, sometimes, be open to a
wider range of considerations than is normally appropriate, it should also be
cautious in the extent to which it explains the outcome of the case.
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Epistemic Humility and Deference

Finally, that courts should consult all available information, including
information about ambient public opinion, does not at all entail that courts
should go on to simply decide what they think best, all things considered.
The information base for a decision and the rule that the decisionmaker
applies to that base are, analytically speaking, entirely different issues. Their
connections, if any, are contingent and pragmatic rather than conceptual.
We mean to underscore an institutional point that we have already mentioned, and that is often overlooked. Circumstances may thrust upon courts
the obligation to make extraordinary decisions, but nothing in that fact, by
itself, entails anything at all about how those decisions are to be made. In
particular, the circumstantial obligation of decision, by itself, does not at all
imply that the court should decide according to its own first-order views.
Rather, an epistemically and politically modest court may well decide that the
best decision is to defer to the views of other institutions, or to let nonjudicial
processes unfold in their own way, as we have suggested with respect to Bush
v. Gore. Or the court may open the possibility of constitutional change without itself effecting that change: the examples drawn from Australia before
1986 and from modern-day Hong Kong can be seen as attempts to create
space in which other institutions, including the citizenry, can experiment
with, and press for, constitutional transformations.
In every constitutional law seminar, a student points out that the “passive
virtues”213—the arts of prudence by which courts avoid or postpone decisions on the merits—are themselves a type of active decision. Of course that
is true as far as it goes, but they are not the same sort of decisions as full
merits decisions in which the court enforces its own first-order views upon
the polity. The same point applies here. Decisions to defer to other institutions, or to unfolding nonjudicial processes, although themselves an exercise
of judicial choice in extraordinary circumstances, are not the same sort of
decision as the choice to lay down constitutional rights and obligations for
other actors. The distinctive virtues of courts—their relatively formal and
structured processes of deliberation, their evenhanded intake of information, and their prohibition of the informal ex parte communications that are
hallmarks of legislative and administrative information-gathering214—may
often prove to be of least advantage in extraordinary circumstances.
Extraordinary cases feature some combination of high political salience, unusual facts, critical stakes, and legal ambiguity, such that lawyers’ distinctive
training and competence is less valuable than in ordinary cases. In such circumstances, institutional humility will often be the better part of prudence,
and of wisdom.

213 See BICKEL, supra note 208, at 111.
214 NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
NOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 123 (1994).
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CONCLUSION
In the nature of things, constitutional decisionism is heavily circumstantial; it is difficult to offer crisp generalizations. That said, the exceptional
cases that call for decisionism by courts fall into surprisingly recurrent patterns, as does the judicial response to such cases. Our aim here has been
modest—to offer a taxonomy of exceptional adjudication, and an analytic
introduction both to the bootstrapping problem that inevitably arises in
exceptional cases, and to the constitutional decisionism that inevitably
results. If we have not provided a general decision procedure for such cases,
it is because—the exception being what it is—there simply is no such
procedure.

